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REVES v. ERNST & YOUNG: THE
ELIMINATION OF PROFESSIONAL
LIABILITY UNDER RICO
In 1970, Congress passed the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Orga-
nizations Act ("RICO"),' as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control
Act.' Prompted by congressional findings that the fraudulent activity of
organized crime permeated the American economy and victimized inno-
cent investors,3 Congress enacted RICO to combat the infiltration of le-
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988).
2. 115 CONG. REC. 39,906 (1969). The Organized Crime Control Act was a "broad-
based reform bill covering such areas as grand juries, immunity, contempt, false state-
ments, depositions, and sentencing for dangerous special offenders." G. Robert Blakey &
Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts-
Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1010, 1017 (1980) (discussing the legislative
initiatives leading to RICO's enactment) (footnotes omitted).
3. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 941-48
(1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 18 (1988)). The Statement of Findings and Purpose
provides:
The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly
sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of
dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force,
fraud, and corruption; (2) organized crime derives a major portion of its power
through money obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan
sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importation and distribution of
narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of social exploitation; (3)
this money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate
business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes;
(4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the
Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations,
interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign com-
merce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the
Nation and its citizens; and (5) organized crime continues to grow because of
defects in the evidence-gathering process of the law inhibiting the development of
the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or
remedies to bear on the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime
and because the sanctions and remedies available to the Government are unnec-
essarily limited in scope and impact.
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the
United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process,
by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and
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gitimate business by organized crime.4 To achieve this goal, Congress
authorized the imposition of substantial criminal and civil penalties
against any person5 violating the statute's provisions.6
Following its enactment, RICO was used primarily in criminal prosecu-
tions,7 but infrequently used by private plaintiffs in the civil context.8 In
4. See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591 (1981) (stating that the "legis-
lative history forcefully supports the view that the major purpose of [RICO) is to address
the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime"); Blakey & Gettings, supra note
2, at 1014-16 (discussing the significance of the infiltration problem); Gerard E. Lynch,
RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & 11, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 661, 662 (1987)
(stating that "Congress viewed RICO principally as a tool for attacking the specific prob-
lem of infiltration of legitimate business by organized criminal syndicates."). See infra
notes 73-79 (describing RICO's substantive provisions which are designed to prevent the
infiltration of organized crime into legitimate businesses).
5. A "person" is "any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial
interest in property." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1988).
6. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963-64 (1988). Section 1963(a) sets forth the criminal penalties that
may be imposed against defendants found guilty of violating the Act. Id. § 1963(a). Crimi-
nal RICO defendants may be subject to a fine not exceeding $25,000, up to twenty years
imprisonment, and the forfeiture of any profits or property that they have acquired as a
result of racketeering activity. Id. Section 1964(a)-(c) sets forth the civil penalties which
provide for divestment, imposition of restrictions, orders of dissolutions, and treble dam-
ages. Id. § 1964(a)-(c). See infra notes 81-82 (providing the text of the provision and dis-
cussing RICO's forfeiture penalty); infra notes 83-86 (discussing the significance of
RICO's provision for treble damage recovery by a private plaintiff), and accompanying
text.
7. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 2, at 1011-12 (describing how prosecutors rarely
used RICO initially, but by the 1980s they were using the Act in a wide range of federal
prosecutions for organized crime, white-collar crime, and a variety of violent offenses); see
also Lynch, supra note 4, at 695. Professor Lynch notes that only four RICO indictments
had been considered in reported federal appellate court opinions throughout 1975, demon-
strating prosecutors' initial tendency to use RICO cautiously. Id. Professor Lynch ex-
plained that these early uses of RICO "involv[ed] classic 'racketeering' schemes that
directly preyed upon legitimate economic activity, or entry into legitimate business by
criminal means." Id. at 696 (footnote omitted).
8. G. Robert Blakey, Forward, Symposium, Law and the Continuing Enterprise: Per-
spectives on RICO, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 873,881 (1990) (indicating that private plain-
tiffs did not use civil RICO until about 1975); Blakey & Gettings, supra note 2, at 1048
(concluding that prior to 1980, criminal prosecutions dominated the use of RICO and that
private plaintiffs had not yet capitalized on the promise of civil RICO); Susan Getzendan-
ner, Judicial "Pruning" of "Garden Variety Fraud" Civil RICO Cases Does Not Work: It's
Time for Congress to Act, 43 VAND. L. REV. 673, 678 (1990) (stating that "civil RICO
percolated for several years before coming to life"). Section 1964(a)-(c) contains the civil
counterpart to criminal RICO. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1988). A civil RICO action may be
brought by either the Attorney General on behalf of the government or a private plaintiff
for injuries sustained as a result of a RICO violation. Id. This Note will not examine the
use of civil RICO by the government, but will focus on the use of RICO by private plain-
tiffs invoking section 1962(c). See ORGANIZED CRIME & RACKETEERING SEC., U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RICO: A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS (1988) (providing a
detailed discussion of the procedures, frequency, and success of the government's use of
civil RICO).
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the 1980s, however, RICO's use in the civil context dramatically in-
creased. 9 Despite RICO's intent to eliminate organized crime, 10 or
"known mobsters,"" private plaintiffs successfully used the statute to at-
tack legitimate business.' 2 RICO's "evolutionary application" to situa-
tions that, arguably, were not contemplated by Congress has had a
significant societal impact.'3 Today, civil RICO is used primarily by pri-
9. A.B.A., SEC. CORP. BANKING & BUSINESS LAW, REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL
RICO TASK FORCE 57 (1985) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]. The Civil RICO Task
Force demonstrated the dramatic change in the use of civil RICO from its "initial dor-
mancy" to its "increased utilization" when it charted 270 district court RICO cases prior to
1985. Id. The Report's statistics indicated that 3% of the cases were decided prior to 1980;
2% were decided in 1980; 7% were decided in 1981; 13% were decided in 1982; 33% were
decided in 1983; and 43% were decided in 1984. Id. at 53a.
10. See Philip A. Lacovara & Geoffrey F. Aronow, The Legal Shakedown of Legiti-
mate Business People: The Runaway Provisions of Private Civil RICO, 21 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 1, 8-9 (1984-85). Lacovara and Aronow recognize that Congress specifically intended
RICO as a mechanism to proscribe the unlawful activities of individuals engaged in organ-
ized crime. Id. Furthermore, the authors argue that Congress did not intend to displace
this limited purpose by incorporating civil enforcement mechanisms. Id. at 9. They con-
tend that "[a]t no time did any supporter of the bills suggest that the private civil remedy
was intended for use against legitimate business people, corporations, or partnerships of
licensed professionals, nor was it to be used in commercial disputes having nothing
whatever to do with the [original limited intent]." Id. at 9 (emphasis in original); see also
supra note 3 (providing the Statement of Findings and Purpose of the Organized Crime
Control Act). But see Blakey, supra note 8, at 874 (stating that Congress did not intend to
limit RICO's scope solely to "the activities of traditional Mafia families").
11. See DAVID B. SMITH & TERRANCE G. REED, CIVIL RICO § 1-5 (1993) (noting
that RICO's application has not been confined to "known mobsters"). Compare Blakey &
Gettings, supra note 2, at 1013-14 (arguing that Congress did not intend to confine RICO's
application to this class of criminals). Professor Blakey, one of RICO's authors, defines
organized criminal behavior or "enterprise criminality" to include simple political corrup-
tion, sophisticated white collar criminal schemes, and traditional Mafia type endeavors. Id.
at 1014.
12. See, e.g., Michael Goldsmith, Civil RICO Reform: The Basis for Compromise, 71
MINN. L. REV. 827, 829 (1987) (citing the concern that RICO's use against legitimate busi-
nesses has generated efforts to reform the statute); Jay Kelly Wright, Why are Professionals
Worried About RICO?, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 983, 984 (1990); Adam F. Ingber, Note,
10b-5 or Not lOb-5?: Are the Current Efforts to Reform Securities Litigation Misguided?, 61
FORDHAM L. REV. S351, 374 (1993) (indicating that civil RICO is used to target legitimate
business more frequently than organized crime); see also infra note 13 (discussing RICO's
increased utilization by private plaintiffs to target garden variety fraud and ordinary com-
mercial disputes among legitimate businesses).
13. Terrance G. Reed, The Defense Case for RICO Reform, 43 VAND. L. REV. 691,
692 n.6 (1990) (citing examples of RICO's evolutionary application: employment grievance
claims, attorney-client disputes, insurance claims, and landlord-tenant litigation). As a re-
sult of civil RICO's expansive evolution, RICO claims are added to virtually all contract
claims and allegations of common law fraud against legitimate businesses. Representative
Rick Boucher explained that "all that is needed to convert a simple contract dispute into a
civil RICO case is the allegation that there was a contract and the additional allegation that
either the mails or the telephones were used more than once in either forming or breaching
the contract." Michael Goldsmith & Mark Jay Linderman, Civil RICO Reform: The Gate-
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vate plaintiffs to target garden-variety fraud and ordinary commercial dis-
putes.14 As a result, courts and scholars are attacking RICO, 5 arguing
that it has evolved beyond its intended statutory reach. 6 Despite this
keeper Concept, 43 VAND. L. REV. 735, 736 (1990) (citing 132 CONG. REC. H9371 (daily ed.
Oct. 8, 1986) (remarks of Representative Rick Boucher, sponsor of 1989 RICO reform
legislation)). Moreover, commentators note that failure to include a RICO claim may be
grounds for legal malpractice. See, e.g., Ethan M. Posner, Note, Clarifying a "Pattern" of
Confusion: A Multi-Factor Approach to Civil RICO's Pattern Requirement, 86 MICH. L.
REV. 1745, 1770 (1988) (acknowledging that "it is so easy and tempting to allege a RICO
claim that counsel may commit malpractice if a RICO claim is not made when the section
1962 statutory elements have been satisfied") (footnote omitted).
14. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 55-56 (reporting that out of the 270 civil
RICO actions surveyed, 40% alleged securities fraud, 37% alleged common law fraud in a
commercial setting, and only 9% alleged "criminal activity of a type generally associated
with professional criminals"); Getzendanner, supra note 8, at 679-80 (defining garden-vari-
ety fraud in the context of RICO complaints as claims "predicated exclusively on mail or
wire fraud, concern[ing] a commercial dispute to which the attorney has added unremark-
able fraud allegations"). The author, a former United States District Court Judge in Chi-
cago, discusses several examples of ordinary commercial disputes transformed into civil
RICO suits. Id. at 673, 679. For example, she cites Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 875 F.2d
1271 (7th Cir. 1989) (including a RICO claim in an action by a supplier who furnished a
purchaser oil in excess of purchaser's credit limit), and Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 385 (7th Cir. 1984) (including a RICO claim in an action
against a bank for charging an interest rate that was higher than the rate originally agreed
upon), aff'd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985). See also Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 832 (stating that
civil RICO suits are "aimed at combatting fraud; relatively few have involved traditional
organized crime groups") (footnote omitted).
15. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 829. The author discusses the arguments
against RICO and the numerous reform bills that have been generated to limit the scope of
the statute. Id. He views anti-RICO arguments as expressing "concerns that RICO suits
against legitimate businesses both distort[ ] the congressional intent underlying the statute
and afford[ I undue opportunity for malicious prosecution." Id. (footnote omitted). More-
over, RICO critics argue that the expansive scope of the statute results in extortionate
litigation, inducing defendants to enter coercive settlements because of the threat of being
labeled a racketeer and the spectre of treble damages. Id. at 857. As a result of substantial
criticism, numerous RICO reforms have been advocated. See Getzendanner, supra note 8,
at 674-75. The author recognizes that "[c]ivil RICO is not intrinsically evil" and has facili-
tated its goal of enabling private plaintiffs to attack patterns of criminality, but "the com-
plaint is that RICO has succeeded too well." Id. at 674. The author suggest that the
elimination of mail and wire fraud as RICO predicate offenses (except for certain class
action suits) will reduce the proliferation of garden variety fraud RICO actions unnecessa-
rily brought into federal court. Id. at 675. The author also suggests eliminating securities
fraud as a RICO predicate offense. Id.; cf Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 13, at 735
(evaluating proposals to screen civil RICO actions, similar to governmental prosecutorial
guidelines); Wright, supra note 12, at 995 (eliminating automatic treble damage recovery in
civil RICO suits); Ingber, Note, supra note 12, at 374 (arguing that RICO reform is prefer-
able to federal securities law reform).
16. The intended scope of the statute is at the heart of the RICO controversy. See,
e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985) (stating that "in its private
civil version, RICO is evolving into something quite different from the original conception
of its enactors"); id. at 501 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that "the civil RICO statute
quite simply revolutionizes private litigation; it validates the federalization of broad areas
1028
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concern, the statute's broad language and the congressional mandate to
interpret RICO liberally' 7 prevent the courts from restricting the scope of
the statute.' 8 Consequently, more individuals are exposed to potential
RICO liability and the harsh spectre of treble damages.' 9
The expanded application of RICO is particularly relevant to profes-
sionals who perform peripheral services for a business entity. 20 Periph-
eral service providers, such as accountants, attorneys, bankers, engineers,
of state common law of frauds, and it approves the displacement of well-established federal
remedial provisions. We do not lightly infer a congressional intent to effect such funda-
mental changes."); Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 828-29 (discussing arguments that the use
of RICO to attack legitimate businesses distorts the congressional intent underlying the
statute); Lacovara & Aronow, supra note 10, at 2-3 (asserting that only a small percentage
of private civil RICO claims involve the activities envisioned by the Act's proponents);
Robert K. Rasmussen, Introductory Remarks and a Comment on Civil RICO's Remedial
Provisions, 43 VAND. L. REV. 623, 627 (1990) (stating "lilt is this civil remedy, coupled
with the ingenuity [and artful pleading] of lawyers, that has resulted in the use of RICO in
a variety of unexpected situations"); Ingber, Note, supra note 12, at 377 (suggesting that an
overly broad application of civil RICO exceeds its original congressional intent); Posner,
Note, supra note 13, at 1769 (stating that "[e]ven though the legislative history suggests
that RICO's applicability should be limited to the type of ongoing illegal activity associated
with professional criminals, the current scope of civil RICO litigation has gone far beyond
this goal"). But see Lynch, supra note 4, at 661 (suggesting that broad draftsmanship left
RICO open to a wide range of applications, but not necessarily unintended applications).
17. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 947 (codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988)). Congress directed that the "provisions of this title shall be
liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." Id.
18. See infra notes 140-67 and accompanying text (discussing the reluctance of the
federal circuits to limit RICO in both civil and criminal cases).
19. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 504 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that without the
presence of a comparable restraint on prosecutorial discretion in the civil context, private
"[p]laintiffs, lured by the prospect of treble damages and attorney's fees, have a strong
incentive to invoke RICO's provisions whenever they can allege in good faith two in-
stances of mail or wire fraud"); see also infra note 83 (providing the text of the private
RICO remedy); infra notes 85-87 (discussing the treble damages provision).
20. Lacovara & Aronow, supra note 10, at 3 (recognizing that private plaintiffs are
using RICO to attack professionals, including investment bankers, brokers, and account-
ants); Wright, supra note 12, at 983 (noting that professionals differ from other RICO
defendants because they lack a "direct stake in the success of the transaction"); Walter F.
McDonough, Note, Does the Punishment Fit the Crime? How Federal and State Civil RICO
Statutes Transform Accountant Liability, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1107, 1107-08 (1992) (dis-
cussing the rise of RICO liability for professionals such as "bankers, insurers, directors,
lawyers, and accountants," but arguing that accountants are the primary target). The au-
thor also relates one financial analyst's account of the increasing application of RICO to
members of the financial industry: "accounting firms that profess to be guilty of nothing
worse than regrettable credulity in their client dealings, have increasingly found themselves
the targets of the same sort of financial and public-relations abuse that known mobsters
must endure." Id. at 1109 n.15.
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and experts,2 ' perform peripheral independent services, but lack exten-
sive financial involvement with their clients.22 These individuals are par-
ticularly susceptible to a private civil action under RICO because of the
preconception that they possess "deep pockets."2 3 In fact, they may be
the only financially viable parties remaining after a business fails.24
Therefore, peripheral service providers, who are threatened with extor-
tionate litigation, suffer disproportionately from the damages resulting
from traditional business fraud. 25 Like most RICO defendants, profes-
sionals are targeted under section 1962(c) 26 based on allegations that they
"participated in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs" by providing fi-
21. Wright, supra note 12, at 983. The special nature of professionals is not limited to
accountants, lawyers, and the like, but can be generalized to a broader class such as
experts.
22. Id. (describing peripheral service providers as individuals "whose services are a
necessary or facilitating ingredient of a business transaction of some type, but who lack a
direct stake in the success of the transaction"). See Edward Brodsky, RICO Liability of
Accountants and Lawyers, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 11, 1992, at 3 (defining a professional in the
context of RICO liability as individuals "such as accountants who do nothing more than
perform services, albeit fraudulently, but do not otherwise participate in the affairs of the
company they represent"); Marcia Coyle, Back to the Law's Intent: RICO Limits Set for
Professionals, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 15, 1993, at 3 (describing professionals as "lawyers, ac-
countants and other[s] ... who advise businesses that find themselves in trouble"). This
Note will refer to professionals or peripheral service providers in its analysis of whether the
class of defendants against whom RICO is used in ordinary commercial fraud cases is an
appropriate RICO target. This Note's use of the term "professional" or "peripheral ser-
vice provider" is confined to the same parameters as Mr. Wright's definition of the term.
See Wright, supra note 12, at 983.
23. Wright, supra note 12, at 984 (arguing that civil RICO's treble damages provision
promotes the tendency to perceive professionals as having excessive funds to satisfy legal
judgments). Moreover, the author indicates that auditors are the preferred defendants in a
RICO action because: (1) they have the appropriate insurance with high limits of liability;
(2) accounting firms, organized as a partnership, have deeper pockets to satisfy claims than
do officers or directors of a corporation; and (3) fraud is usually excluded from a corporate
director's or officer's insurance policy. Id. at 992; see also Mark Stephen Poker, Reaching a
Deep Pocket Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 72 MARQ. L.
REV. 511, 512 (1989) (asserting that "a RICO suit would not be economically worthwhile,
unless the plaintiff had access to a 'deep pocket' ").
24. Wright, supra note 12, at 991 (noting that, in the case of a failed business, investors
frequently rely exclusively on professionals for economic redress); McDonough, Note,
supra note 20, at 1111 (asserting that because failed businesses do not have insurance avail-
able to satisfy a civil judgment for damages, accountants, who are adequately insured, are
the defendants of choice in a civil RICO action).
25. Wright, supra note 12, at 984-97 (supporting the elimination of treble damages
because a professional is exposed to "enormous, potentially indeterminate damages wholly
disproportionate[ ] to the professional's undertaking or conduct"). Id. at 984; McDon-
ough, Note, supra note 20, at 1112 (stating that the legal system unfairly penalizes account-
ants in RICO suits because accountants are a more likely target, due to their unsurpassed
liability coverage).
26. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 57 (estimating that 97% of RICO cases
allege a § 1962(c) violation); see also infra note 75 (providing the text of § 1962(c)).
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nancial or advisory opinions which resulted in fraud.27 The scope of sec-
tion 1962(c) in this context, however, remained unclear.28
The federal circuit courts inconsistently determined the level of "partic-
ipation" that section 1962(c) requires to impose RICO liability.2 9 The
Eighth Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit adopted an "opera-
tion or management" test that requires the defendant to have partici-
pated in the direction of the enterprise's affairs.30 The Second, Third,
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, however, interpreted
section 1962(c) more expansively3' by requiring participation in activities
which merely relate to or affect the enterprise.32
The United States Supreme Court recently sought to reconcile these
standards when it considered whether an independent accounting firm
that provided fraudulent auditing services must participate in the opera-
tion or management of the enterprise itself to be subject to section
1962(c) liability.33 In Reves v. Ernst & Young,34 the Court adopted the
Eighth Circuit's operation or management test, and interpreted section
1962(c) to impose liability on individuals participating in and directing
the affairs of the business.3 5 Significantly, the Reves decision departs
from traditional liberal RICO jurisprudence,3 6 and adopts an approach
27. Wright, supra note 12, at 983 (voicing concern over the application of RICO).
28. See infra notes 132-202 (discussing the different legal standards used by the federal
circuits to satisfy § 1962(c)).
29. Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers Local Union 639, 913 F.2d 948, 952 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (stating that the federal circuit courts "have followed divergent paths and have
reached disparate conclusions" on this issue), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2839 (1991).
30. See Yellow Bus Lines, 913 F.2d at 954; Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, Prudential Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983); infra notes 194-202
(outlining the District of Columbia Circuit's test); infra notes 180-93 (outlining the Eighth
Circuit's test).
31. See Overnite Transp. Co. v. Truck Drivers Local 705, 904 F.2d 391, 394 (7th Cir.
1990); United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 866
(1988); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966, 970
(11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1332-33 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1985); Unites States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194, 200 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982); United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981).
32. See supra note 31 (citing decisions interpreting § 1962(c) more expansively). See
infra notes 140-57 (outlining the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuit tests); infra notes 158-67
(outlining the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuit tests); infra notes 168-76 (outlining the
Eleventh Circuit's test).
33. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1165 (1993).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1170.
36. See infra notes 93-131 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
expansive interpretations of RICO).
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that restricts both the scope and application of the statute.37 As a result
of Reves, professionals once targeted by civil RICO claims will fall
outside of the statute's scope unless the plaintiff can demonstrate the sig-
nificance of the professional's role in the fraudulent activity.38
In Reves, the Farmer's Cooperative of Arkansas and Oklahoma, Inc.
("the Co-op") sold demand notes in an attempt to raise money for its
operating expenses.39 Jack White, the Co-op's general manager, bor-
rowed approximately four million dollars from the Co-op to construct
and operate the gasohol plant of his company, White Flame Fuels, Inc.
("White Flame").4" White and his accountant were later indicted on
charges of tax fraud, and the Co-op ultimately decided to purchase White
Flame and release White's debts.
4'
37. See Ingber, Note, supra note 12, at 378 n.184 (stating that Reves is a landmark
decision because it represents "one of the first times the Supreme Court has limited
RICO's application by side-stepping RICO's 'liberal construction clause' which directs the
Court to interpret RICO's provisions liberally"). In several prior Supreme Court deci-
sions, the Court had determined that it would not restrict civil RICO. See, e.g., H.J., Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989) (following traditional RICO jurisprudence
by rejecting a suggested limitation to the pattern requirement); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 (1985) (suggesting that a restrictive interpretation of the RICO
provision at issue would contradict prior case law and general principles which construe
RICO broadly). The departure from traditional RICO jurisprudence, however, appears to
be limited to this specific context. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court once again
rejected a limitation to a RICO substantive provision. See National Org. For Women, Inc.
v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994) (stating that § 1962(c) does not require that the racke-
teering acts be economically motivated). The Court reiterated its prior support for broad
interpretations of RICO, and indicated that Congress enacted RICO based on the "per-
ceived need to combat organized crime. But Congress for cogent reasons chose to enact a
more general statute, one which, although it had organized crime as its focus, was not
limited in application to organized crime." Id. at 805 (citing H.J. Inc., v. Northwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248 (1989)).
38. McDonough, Note, supra note 20, at 1125 (indicating that Reves will potentially
limit an accountant's exposure to RICO liability, but recognizing that the precise parame-
ters of this liability can only be ascertained by further litigation). See infra notes 293-302
and accompanying text (discussing future implications of the Reves decision); see also Har-
vey L. Pitt & Dixie L. Johnson, Freeing Corporate Professional Advisers From the Threat of
RICO Liability, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 15, 1993, at 1, 4 (stating that, after the Supreme Court
decided Reves, "relief surely could be heard emanating from accountants and attorneys"
because the decision "narrows and curtails their possible exposure to RICO liability"). It
is important to note that although Reves potentially limits professional liability under
§ 1962(c), other weapons may be available to attack professionals under RICO. See infra
notes 73-76 (discussing other activities prohibited by RICO).
39. Arthur Young v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310, 1315 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, Ernst &
Young v. Reves, 112 S.Ct. 1165 (1992), aff'd 113 S.Ct. 1163 (1993).
40. Id. Although White Flame began producing gasohol in 1980, White continued to
borrow funds from the Co-op because the company experienced financial problems as a
result of the "plant's poor design and outside economic factors." ld.
41. Id. at 1315-16. The indictment against White alleged that he engaged in a course
of self dealing with the Co-op and that he filed fraudulent tax returns. Id. at 1315. Shortly
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The Co-op retained the accounting firm of Arthur Young 2 to perform
its 1981 and 1982 audits.43 Arthur Young calculated the fixed-asset value
of White Flame and provided guidance on the treatment of that value for
accounting purposes." The date on which the Co-op acquired White
Flame was essential to the valuation assessment.4 5 Despite uncertainty
about the acquisition date, Arthur Young valued White Flame at $4.5
million.46 However, Arthur Young failed to reveal to the Co-op's board
of directors that without this higher valuation, the Co-op would be
insolvent.47
In 1984, the Co-op experienced a run on its demand notes and was
unable to secure further financing.48 As a result, the Co-op filed for
bankruptcy, thereby preventing investors from redeeming their notes.4 9
after he was indicted, White proposed that the Co-op assume his debts in exchange for
White Flame's stock. Id. On November 12, 1980, the Board agreed to White's proposal
and voted to acquire White Flame. Id. The Co-op filed a declaratory judgement against
White and White Flame alleging that the stock had not been transferred, even though the
Co-op had continued to invest in the plant, and had not executed a note assuming White's
debts. Id. The parties filed a consent decree which provided that the Co-op owned White
Flame as of February 15, 1980 and that White was relieved of his $4 million debt. Id. at
1316. However, the minutes of the board meeting reveal that discussions to purchase
White Flame did not take place until November 12, 1980. Id. at 1315.
42. Id. at 1315. Russell Brown & Co. merged with Arthur Young and Company in
1982, and later became respondent Ernst & Young. Id. In its opinion, the Supreme Court
refers to the accounting firm as "Arthur Young" to remain consistent with previous judicial
writings. Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1167 n.2. Similarly, this Note refers to the firm as Arthur
Young.
43. Id. at 1316-20.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1317. According to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, if the Co-op
acquired the gasohol plant at its inception in 1979, then it should be valued at approxi-
mately $4.5 million. Id. However, if the Co-op acquired the plant at a later date, by acqui-
sition or purchase, for instance, then it would be assigned the fair market value at the time
of the audit. Id. Arthur Young's valuation of the plant was much lower, ranging from
approximately $450,000 to $1.5 million. Id. at 1317 n.7.
46. Id. at 1317.
47. Id. at 1317-18. Arthur Young valued the gasohol plant at the same figure used by
the Co-op's previous accountants who had been convicted of tax fraud and had testified
they fabricated the figures at White's request. Id. at 1317 n.4. The accounting firm did
qualify its financial statement by noting that it was concerned that the Co-op would be
unable to recover the losses generated by the plant. Id. at 1317. Nonetheless, the firm did
not reveal to the board that it also was concerned about the valuation of the plant. Id.
48. Id. at 1321. As a result of an increasing demand by investors to redeem their
investments, the Co-op attempted to increase its line of credit from the Cooperative Fi-
nance Association ("CFA"). Id. CFA refused to advance the Co-op additional funds be-
cause the total demand note investment in the Co-op had dropped below $9.5 million. Id.
49. Id. The notes were frozen in the bankruptcy estate. Id.
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The trustee in bankruptcy filed a class action5" in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Arkansas on behalf of certain de-
mand noteholders." The plaintiffs claimed that Arthur Young, a material
participant in the operation and management of the Co-op, violated sec-
tion 1962(c) of RICO by fraudulently preparing financial data and con-
cealing that data from the Co-op.5 2 The district court granted the
accounting firm's motion for summary judgment after finding that Arthur
Young's involvement in the Co-op did not rise to a level of operation or
management as required by section 1962(c). 3 The district court applied
the Eighth Circuit's operation or management test, adopted in Bennett v.
Berg,5 4 to determine that Arthur Young's participation did not constitute
a RICO violation.
55
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
district court's grant of summary judgment. 6 The court of appeals also
applied the Bennett formulation, which "require[s] some participation in
the operation or management of the enterprise itself.",57 Based on Ar-
thur Young's limited involvement, the appellate court determined that
50. Id. at 1322. The district court certified a class of noteholders, consisting of individ-
uals who had purchased demand notes from the Co-op between February 15, 1980 and
February 23, 1984. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. The Co-op's bankruptcy gave rise to other litigation. See Reves v. Ernst &
Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990) (holding that the demand notes were securities under federal
securities laws).
53. Arthur Young, 937 F.2d at 1321-24. After trial, the jury found that Arthur Young
had committed both state and federal securities fraud and calculated the plaintiffs' dam-
ages at $6,121,652.94 as a result of the fraud. Id.
54. 710 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Bennett, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983). See infra notes 180-93 and accompanying text (discussing
the Eighth Circuit's operation or management test).
55. Arthur Young, 937 F.2d at 1324. The court of appeals cited the district court
opinion:
Plaintiffs have failed to show anything more than that the accountants reviewed
a series of completed transactions, and certified the Co-op's records as fairly por-
traying its financial status as of a date three or four months preceding the meet-
ings of the directors and the shareholders at which they presented their reports.
We do not hesitate to declare that such activities fail to satisfy the degree of man-
agement required by Bennett v. Berg.
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1168 (1993).
56. Arthur Young, 937 F.2d at 1324.
57. Id. The court of appeals acknowledged the inconsistent interpretations among the
federal circuits, but found that it was bound by precedent until the Supreme Court rejected
the operation or management standard. Id. See infra notes 132-202 and accompanying
text (discussing the conflict between the federal circuits over the level of participation re-
quired by § 1962(c)).
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the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the test 58 The appellate court concluded
that despite the improprieties perpetuated by Arthur Young, the account-
ing firm's actions were insufficient to trigger RICO liability.
5 9
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit's deci-
sion' and adopted the Eighth Circuit's operation or management test as
the proper legal standard in evaluating the level of participation required
by section 1962(c). 61 The Court determined that the term "conduct," as
used in section 1962(c), imports some degree of direction.62 The Court
found that this formulation is consistent with both the legislative history
of RICO63 and the congressional mandate to construe the Act liberally.'
The Court concluded that Arthur Young's failure to inform the Co-op's
board of directors of its potential insolvency did not constitute participa-
tion in the operation or management of the Co-op's affairs.65
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Souter, joined by Justice White, rejected
both the operation or management test and the majority's application of
that test to Arthur Young's involvement with the Co-op. 6 6 The dissent
found that the language of section 1962(c) was ambiguous, thereby man-
dating deferral to the statute's liberal construction clause, which was "not
irrelevant, but dispositive. ' '67 Furthermore, the dissent argued that even
if it did accept the majority's view of section 1962(c), it could not join in
the judgment because, in its view, the majority misapplied its own test.68
The dissent found that when Arthur Young created the financial reports
that failed to disclose the Co-op's insolvency, it engaged in the execution
58. Id. (stating that Arthur Young's involvement "was limited to the audits, meetings
with the Board of Directors to explain the audits, and presentations at the annual
meetings").
59. Id. (stating that "it is clear that Arthur Young committed a number of reprehensi-
ble acts, but these acts in no way rise to the level of participation in the management or
operation of the Co-op").
60. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993). A majority of Justices affirmed
the decision. Justices Scalia and Thomas joined the majority opinion, but did not join in
Part IV-A. Id. at 1165 n.1. Justices Souter and White dissented. Id. at 1165.
61. Id. at 1173.
62. Id. at 1169.
63. Id. at 1170-72 (citing the numerous references to "management" and "operating"
in the legislative history provisions discussing § 1962(c)).
64. Id. (arguing that the liberal construction clause does not apply because the statu-
tory language and legislative intent are clear).
65. Id. at 1173-74.
66. Id. at 1175 (Souter, J. & White, J., dissenting).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1178.
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of a managerial function, rather than traditional auditing activity.69 Thus,
the dissent concluded that Arthur Young should incur RICO liability.
70
This Note examines whether professionals who perform fraudulent
services and who are peripherally involved in an enterprise should be
civilly liable under the conduct or participation requirement of section
1962(c). First, this Note presents an overview of traditional RICO juris-
prudence, and the statute's history of liberal interpretation. Next, this
Note compares and contrasts the circuit courts' restrictive and liberal in-
terpretations of the participation requirement. This Note then analyzes
the Supreme Court's opinion in Reves v. Ernst & Young, and argues that
the adoption of an operation or management test is faithful to the statu-
tory language and broad remedial purposes of RICO. Moreover, this test
provides necessary parameters for interpreting the statutory guidelines in
the specific context of independent professional service providers. This
Note suggests that the majority's restrictive application of the operation
or management test in Reves will perpetuate further confinement of
RICO's participation requirement. This may effectively insulate profes-
sionals who perform peripheral services from future civil RICO liability
and the severe threat of treble damages. This Note concludes that the
majority in Reves has reached the appropriate result, because profession-
als who perform peripheral services, absent a higher level of culpability,
are not the type of individuals civil RICO should target.
I. TRADITIONAL RICO JURISPRUDENCE
A. Overview of Criminal and Civil RICO
The RICO statute delineates standards of unlawful conduct enforcea-
ble through criminal and civil sanctions.71 In section 1962, the heart of
RICO's substantive provisions, the Act proscribes four general types of
69. Id. at 1176 (asserting that Arthur Young had "step[ed] out of its auditing shoes and
into those of management, in creating the financial record on which the Co-op's solvency
was erroneously predicated").
70. Id.
71. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988). RICO provides both a criminal and a private cause
of action against any individual violating its substantive provisions. Id. §§ 1963-64. See
supra note 6 (discussing generally criminal and civil penalties under RICO); infra note 82
(discussing RICO's criminal forfeiture provisions); infra notes 83-86 (discussing the treble
damages awarded to private plaintiffs). The fundamental differences between a criminal
and civil RICO action are the penalties imposed and the procedural mechanisms and safe-
guards inherent in the different causes of action. See, e.g., JED S. RAKOFF & HOWARD W.
GOLDSTEIN, RICO CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAW AND STRATEGY (1994) (providing a com-
prehensive evaluation of both criminal and civil RICO actions). A detailed comparison of
the differences, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
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activities.72 First, RICO prohibits using income derived from a pattern of
racketeering activity to acquire an interest in an enterprise.7 3 Second,
RICO prohibits acquiring or maintaining an interest in an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity.7 4 Third, RICO prohibits con-
ducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity.75 Finally, RICO makes it unlawful to conspire to commit any of
these three activities.76
These substantive provisions must be read in the context of the Act's
statutory definitions. "[E]nterprise" is defined to "include[ ] any individ-
ual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal en-
tity."' 77 A "pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of
72. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) (1988). See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text (pro-
viding the full text of the four activities RICO proscribes as unlawful conduct).
73. Section 1962(a) states in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, di-
rectly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection
of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal.., to use
or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such
income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any
enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or for-
eign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988). See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (defining enter-
prise, pattern of racketeering, and racketeering activity).
74. Section 1962(b) states: "It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of
racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, di-
rectly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1988).
75. Section 1962(c) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enter-
prise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce,
to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
Id. § 1962(c) (1988).
76. Section 1962(d) states: "It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate
any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section." Id. § 1962(d) (1988); see
also Donald W. Cassidy, Comment, Turning RICO on its Head: Schiffels v. Kemper Fin.
Serv., Inc. and the Need to Limit Standing Under § 1962(d) to Plaintiffs Who Allege Injuries
From Racketeering Acts, 78 MINN. L. REV. 467, 485-89 (1993) (discussing the conflict
among the federal circuits concerning the appropriate standing requirement to allege a
private cause of action based on a RICO conspiracy violation).
77. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988). An enterprise may be a legitimate or an illegitimate
business entity. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981) (stating that an enter-
prise "is proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evi-
dence that the various associates function as a continuing unit"); see also United States v.
Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.) (endorsing the government's contention that loosely knit
associations constitute RICO enterprises), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978). Courts have
held that labor unions and law firms may be RICO enterprises. See United States v.
Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194 (3d Cir.) (finding a labor union to be a RICO enterprise), cert.
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"racketeering activity" committed within a ten year period.7" The statute
classifies three broad categories of crimes as racketeering activity.79
RICO operates in both the criminal and civil context.8 ' Section 1963
sets forth the criminal sanctions for violations of section 1962.81 RICO's
most significant criminal enforcement mechanism is its forfeiture provi-
sion. Under this provision, convicted defendants may be required to for-
feit both the ill-gotten gains they have acquired, and the economic base
they command, because the financial or property interest controlled by
the defendants enable them to exert power over the enterprise in-
volved.8 2 The private civil enforcement mechanism appears in section
denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982); United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding
that a labor union constituted a RICO enterprise), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981); United
States v. Jannotti, 729 F.2d 213 (3d Cir.) (holding that a law firm constituted a RICO enter-
prise), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 880 (1984).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988). See H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S.
229, 239 (1989) (stating a "pattern of racketeering" requires a showing that the predicate
acts "are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity")
(emphasis in original); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985) (stating
that it is the "factor of continuity plus relationship which combines to produce a pattern"
that must include at least two isolated acts of racketeering) (emphasis in original). But see
Posner, Note, supra note 13, at 1747 (arguing that despite Sedima's interpretation of the
pattern element, courts do not have a consistent approach to the requirement).
79. The three categories of crimes are: any of several specified acts, including murder
and arson, chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one
year; any act which is indictable under any of the several specified sections of Title 18,
U.S.C., or federal offenses involving narcotics or other dangerous drugs. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(1) (1988); see also United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 897 (5th Cir.) (outlining the
three categories of crimes), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978). Most civil RICO claims al-
lege mail, wire, or securities fraud as the predicate offense. See Getzendanner, supra note
8, at 678; Posner, Note, supra note 13, at 1747 n.14 (stating that "[i]t is the inclusion of
these predicate acts [of mail, wire, and securities fraud] which has led to the unexpectedly
broad application of civil RICO"); TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 9, (providing statistics
on the frequency in which mail, wire and securities fraud are used as predicate acts in civil
RICO actions).
80. See supra note 71 (discussing the distinction between civil and criminal RICO
actions).
81. Section 1963(a) provides:
Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years (or for life if the violation is
based on a racketeering activity for which the maximum penalty includes life im-
prisonment), or both, and shall forfeit to the United States, irrespective of any
provision of state law (1) any interest the person has acquired or maintained in
violation of section 1962; (2) any (A) interest in; (B) security of; (C) claim against;
or (D) property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of influence
over; any enterprise which the person has established, operated, controlled, con-
ducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988 & Supp. 111990).
82. Id. § 1963(a). The Supreme Court addressed RICO's criminal forfeiture provision
in Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993). In Alexander, the owner of an adult
entertainment business was required to forfeit his business and the assets derived from his
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1964(c).83 It is designed to provide a civil RICO victim with adequate
compensation and to discourage individuals from engaging in activity that
would violate RICO.84 Similar to antitrust law, RICO's private enforce-
ment mechanism permits recovery for treble damages,85 which creates an
economic incentive for private plaintiffs to attack organized crime.
86 Fi-
nally, Congress has directed that courts construe RICO's provisions liber-
ally to effectuate the statute's remedial purposes.87
activities after he was convicted of three RICO counts predicated on 17 obscenity convic-
tions. Id. at 2769-70. Alexander contested the forfeiture order on the grounds that it vio-
lated his First Amendment right to free speech and was disproportionate to the gravity of
the crime. Id. at 2770. The Supreme Court rejected the First Amendment challenge and
stated that RICO requires forfeiture of assets "because of the financial role they play in the
operation of the racketeering enterprise." Id. at 2772. RICO is "not a prior restraint on
speech, but a punishment for past criminal conduct." Id. The Court remanded the case to
the Eighth Circuit to determine the proportionality of the forfeiture to the crime. Id. at
2776; see also Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) (ordering the forfeiture of
insurance proceeds from criminal arson activities after finding that a defendant's "ill-got-
ten gains" include both profits and proceeds derived from racketeering); United States v.
Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983) (requiring that an entire partnership interest, an
economic base, be forfeited), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984); Blakey & Gettings, supra
note 2, at 1033-35 (providing a detailed description of criminal RICO).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988). Section 1964(c) provides: "Any person injured in his
business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue there-
for in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages
he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Id.
84. Blakey, supra note 8, at 878 (stating that a private RICO cause of action" 'deter[s]
violators and provide[s] ample compensation to . . . victims' ") (alteration in original)
(quoting Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982)); Goldsmith & Linder-
man, supra note 13, at 834-35 (arguing that treble damages are appropriate because they
serve a deterrent and compensatory function). Many commentators note that RICO's civil
enforcement mechanism was an extremely late addition to the Act and was not extensively
discussed in the legislative history. See, e.g., Getzendanner, supra note 8, at 677-78 (stating
that "[e]veryone who has examined the legislative history of RICO, [with one exception],
has pointed out that Congress added the private civil treble damages remedy to RICO with
virtually no consideration of its purpose or consequences") (footnote omitted). Id.
85. 18 U.S.C § 1964(c) (1988). RICO's treble damages provision is only available to a
private plaintiff and is modeled after antitrust law. Blakey, supra note 8, at 878; see also
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988) (stating that "any person who shall be injured in his business or
property ... may sue therefor in any district court ... and shall recover threefold the
damages").
86. See Judith A. Morse, Note, Treble Damages Under RICO: Characterization and
Computation, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 526, 533-34 (1986). The author describes RICO's
purpose as "(1) encourag[ing] private citizens to bring RICO actions, (2) deter[ring] future
violators, and (3) compensat[ing] victims for all accumulative harm. These multiple and
convergent purposes make the treble damage provision a powerful mechanism in the effort
to vindicate the interests of those victimized by crime." Id. (footnote omitted).
87. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904 (a), 84 Stat. 947
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988)). See supra note 17 (providing text of the legislative
statement).
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B. The Supreme Court's Liberal Interpretation and
Expansion of RICO
RICO is one of the most sophisticated and complicated federal stat-
utes.88 Scholars who have studied the Act disagree as to RICO's proper
use in the civil and criminal contexts.89 While some praise RICO's suc-
cess as an innovative and flexible weapon to attack organized criminal
behavior,9" others criticize RICO's frequent use in the civil context and
assert that many private actions are abusive.9" Traditionally, because of
its broad statutory language and its liberal construction clause,92 the
Supreme Court has been reluctant to place limits on RICO's statutory
scope."3 Arguably, the Court's liberal interpretation of RICO has re-
sulted in the statute's application to situations unintended by its
drafters.94
88. See, e.g., Sun Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 196-97 (9th Cir. 1987)
(Burns, J., concurring) (describing RICO as an "agonizingly difficult and confusing area of
the law," and calling for congressional reform to curb further RICO expansion); Blakey &
Gettings, supra note 2, at 1014 (stating that RICO is "one of the most sophisticated stat-
utes ever enacted by Congress"); see Lynch, supra note 4, at 661 (indicating that RICO's
broad draftsmanship has generated many attempts to resolve the numerous issues of inter-
pretation presented by the Act).
89. See supra notes 11-16 (surveying the criticisms of RICO); infra notes 90-99 (com-
paring the views of the proponents and critics of RICO).
90. Blakey, supra note 8, at 875, 881 (stating that RICO embodies an "innovative ap-
proach to crime control"). Its effective use against sophisticated forms of criminality has
prompted many states to adopt similar legislation. Id.
91. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text (discussing the criticisms of RICO in
the civil context).
92. See supra notes 17, 87 (discussing RICO's liberal construction clause).
93. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459 (1990) (rejecting a contention that federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over RICO claims); H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989) (cautioning that restrictive interpretations of the statute are im-
permissible because they might frustrate Congress' remedial purposes); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1985) (rejecting an attempt to augment RICO's standing
requirement to include an allegation of a separate racketeering injury); Russello v. United
States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) (stating that, based on the statute's breadth and the congres-
sional directive to interpret RICO liberally, the profits and proceeds derived from racke-
teering are subject to RICO's forfeiture provision); United States v. Thrkette, 452 U.S. 576,
583 (1981) (rejecting the argument that a RICO enterprise can only be a legitimate busi-
ness entity). In addition, some commentators argue that it is inappropriate for the judici-
ary to attempt to restrict the statute. See, e.g., Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and
Impropriety of Judicial Restrictions, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1101, 1118-20 (1982) (arguing that
the broad statutory language and congressional intent underlying RICO prohibits judicial
restriction).
94. See SMITH & REED, supra note 11, § 1.01, at 1-5 (stating that courts, rather than
confining the application of RICO to "known mobsters," have permitted the Act to target
"a wide variety of persons and situations not envisioned by the enacting Congress") (foot-
notes omitted); Reed, supra note 13, at 692-96 (arguing that the expansive reach and unin-
tended consequences of RICO are attributable to the failure of federal courts to restrict
the three core elements of the statute: predicate acts, a pattern of racketeering conduct,
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1. Criminal Interpretation and Expansion
Since RICO's enactment, the Supreme Court has enunciated guidelines
to interpret RICO's statutory provisions. 95 The Court demonstrated the
Act's breadth in the context of a criminal RICO prosecution in United
States v. Turkette.9 6 In Turkette, the Court indicated that it will reject
interpretations that clearly depart from RICO's statutory language 97 be-
cause rules of statutory construction are designed to resolve and not cre-
ate ambiguity.9 8 In construing the scope of a statute where the language
and an involved enterprise); see also Getzendanner, supra note 8, at 675, 679-81 (propos-
ing to eliminate mail, wire, and securities fraud as RICO predicate offenses so civil recov-
ery would be available to the appropriate victims-victims of classic mobster behavior).
95. Prior to Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993), and Alexander v. United
States, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993) (addressing RICO's criminal forfeiture provision), the
Supreme Court had interpreted RICO's provisions on nine occasions. See Holmes v. Se-
curities Investor Protection Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1311, 1317 (1992) (holding that a private
plaintiff must establish that the defendant's RICO violation proximately caused the plain-
tiff's injury in order to recover under § 1964(c)); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990)
(holding that states have concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over civil RICO claims);
H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989) (interpreting the defini-
tion of "pattern of racketeering activity" to require a showing that "the racketeering predi-
cates are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity."
(emphasis in original)); Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46 (1989) (addressing
RICO's criminal forfeiture provision); Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs.,
483 U.S. 143 (1987) (holding that a four year statute of limitations applies to civil RICO
claims); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (determining
that civil RICO claims are amenable to arbitration); Sedima, S.P.R.L., 473 U.S. at 479
(rejecting the imposition of a special racketeering injury requirement to prove a RICO
violation); American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc., 473 U.S. 606 (1985); Russello,
464 U.S. at 16 (holding that criminal forfeiture may include the profits and proceeds the
defendant has acquired through racketeering activity); Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583 (holding
that both legitimate and criminal enterprises can satisfy RICO's enterprise element).
96. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
97. Id. at 581 (the court noted that "[tihe Court of Appeals... clearly departed from
and limited the statutory language. It gave several reasons for doing so, none of which is
adequate.").
98. Id. at 587 n.10. The Court noted that it was inappropriate to apply the rule of
lenity, a maxim requiring strict construction of criminal statutes, because there was no
ambiguity in the RICO provisions at issue. Id. The Court proposed that:
[t]he canon in favor of strict construction [of criminal statutes] is not an inexora-
ble command to override common sense and evident statutory purpose .... Nor
does it demand that a statute be given the 'narrowest meaning'; it is satisfied if the
words are given their fair meaning in accord with the manifest intent of the
lawmakers.
Id. at 587-88 n.10 (quoting United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25 (1948)). Additionally,
the Court rejected the appellate court's reliance on the rule of ejusdem generis, which is a
tool of statutory interpretation, by "suggesting that where general words follow a specific
enumeration of persons or things, the general words should be limited to persons or things
similar to those specifically enumerated." Id. at 581. Again, the Court instructed that rules
of statutory construction "come[ ] into play only when there is some uncertainty as to the
meaning of a particular clause in a statute." Id.
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is unambiguous, the Court noted that the statute's language is dispositive
unless Congress has indicated a contrary interpretation.99
The Turkette Court interpreted the parameters of the term "enterprise"
in section 1962(c) to include illegitimate as well as legitimate entities.'"
The Court reversed the First Circuit, which supported the defendant's
contention that section 1962(c) does not apply to illegal enterprises, but
only to the infiltration of legitimate businesses. 10' Such an interpretation,
the Court found, contradicted the plain language of the statute.10 2 The
Court reasoned that if Congress had intended to exclude individuals
whose purpose was exclusively criminal, then it would have included the
word "legitimate" in the definition of enterprise.' 03 Moreover, the Court
found that the congressional declaration "to seek the eradication of or-
ganized crime"' 4 supported its determination. 10 5 The Court concluded
that the incorporation of illegitimate entities into the definition of an en-
terprise was clearly within this broad purpose °6 Thus, the Court broadly
interpreted the term "enterprise" in section 1962(c) in accordance with
99. Id. at 580 (noting that, after initial examination, "[i]f the statutory language is un-
ambiguous, in the absence of 'a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that
language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive' ") (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)). The Court indicated, however,
that a conclusive method of determining "unambiguous" language does not exist. Id.
100. Id. at 593. In Turkene, a group of individuals associated for the purposes of engag-
ing in narcotics trafficking, arson, bribery, and fraud. Id. at 579; see also, Lynch, supra
note 4, at 700-06 (discussing the facts and significance of Turkette). The author asserts that
"the use of RICO against illicit enterprises would become the most important, and the
most radical, application of the criminal provisions of RICO." Id. at 699-700. This is sig-
nificant because "[a]fter Turkette, RICO makes it a crime not only to infiltrate or corrupt
legitimate enterprises, but also to be a gangster, whether in the Mafia or in a much more
loosely affiliated criminal combine." Id. at 706.
101. United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1980) (arguing that the extension
of RICO would collapse the enterprise requirement into the pattern of racketeering re-
quirement), rev'd, 452 U.S. 576 (1981). The Supreme Court recognized that "proof used to
establish these separate elements may in particular cases coalesce, [but) proof of one does
not necessarily establish the other." Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583. The Court concluded that
"the Government must prove both the existence of an 'enterprise' and the connected 'pat-
tern of racketeering activity.'" Id.
102. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580 (stating that the definition of "enterprise" in § 1961(4)
requires an association of individuals in fact, but does not place any limitations upon the
association).
103. Id. at 580-81.
104. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 941-48
(1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 18 (1988)). See supra note 3 (providing a detailed statement
of these findings).
105. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 589.
106. Id.
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the legislative intent to promote legitimate law enforcement measures
against the evils of organized crime." 7
2. Civil RICO Jurisprudence
In contrast to the broad application of criminal RICO, federal courts
attempted to place limits on the statute's use in the civil context.' The
Supreme Court, however, continued to use a liberal approach by broadly
applying RICO in civil cases.'0 9 In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. , 1 the
Court approved the use of RICO in the civil context, but refrained from
giving such application complete legitimacy."' In Sedima, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit strictly interpreted section
1964(c)" 2 by imposing extrajudicial limitations on the language of the
statute." 3 Despite legitimate concerns regarding the overbreadth of civil
107. Id. (indicating that limiting an enterprise to include only legitimate business would
place "[wihole areas of organized criminal activity ... beyond the substantive reach [of
RICO]").
108. Federal courts attempted to restrict the reach of civil RICO by imposing four dif-
ferent limitations, reasoning that "Congress could not have intended to federalize all 'gar-
den variety' fraud claims." Posner, Note, supra note 13, at 1749-53. A civil RICO plaintiff
may be required to show: an "organized crime," a "competitive injury," a "racketeering
injury," and a "prior conviction." Id. Similarly, some courts employed a "double stan-
dard" by only restricting the substantive requirements for a civil RICO action. See Reed,
supra note 13, at 698 (discussing a federal court's endorsement of a broad pattern require-
ment in the criminal context, but not in the civil setting, demonstrating "a general judicial
willingness to tolerate RICO's overbreadth in a criminal context, but not when applied in a
civil prosecution"); see also GOLDSMITH & LINDERMAN, supra note 13, at 735 (discussing
the absence of prosecutorial discretion when deciding to initiate a Civil RICO action).
109. One commentator noted that:
Private parties first began to use RICO's civil remedies after federal courts had
upheld broad applications of RICO in criminal prosecutions .... Like federal
prosecutors, civil RICO plaintiffs have relied on the broader RICO predicates
such as the mail and wire fraud statutes to transform common-law contract and
tort suits into RICO violations. While these civil claims fit squarely within
RICO's accommodating language, federal courts and civil defense counsel ini-
tially recoiled at this use of RICO. The Supreme Court, however, already was
committed to broad, literal interpretations of RICO when pressed by the govern-
ment in criminal prosecutions and continued to interpret RICO's civil provisions
broadly.
Reed, supra note 13, at 707 (footnotes omitted).
110. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
111. Id. at 499-500. See infra notes 114-23 and accompanying text (discussing the
Court's willingness to tolerate RICO's overbreadth in the civil context).
112. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988). Section 1964(c) provides for a private civil action to
recover treble damages for injury "by reason of a violation of" its substantive provisions.
Id.
113. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2nd Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479
(1985). In Sedima, a Belgian corporation, after entering a joint venture with Imrex Co.,
instituted a civil RICO action against Imrex alleging overbilling. Id. at 484. The Second
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the RICO claim, and held that the prior conviction re-
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RICO, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court decision, and
held that a civil action for treble damages under section 1964(c) can pro-
ceed even in the absence of a criminal conviction.' 14 The Court also re-
jected the notion that a plaintiff must have suffered a distinct
"racketeering injury.""' 5 Instead, the Court found that a plaintiff need
only prove a violation of section 1962,116 and demonstrate that the de-
fendant has caused injury by the commission of "predicate acts suffi-
ciently related to constitute a pattern.'
17
The Sedima Court reasoned that the imposition of a racketeering in-
jury requirement for recovery in a private civil RICO action was inappro-
priate in light of the principles surrounding RICO." 8 These guiding
principles include the congressional mandate to construe RICO liber-
ally, 1' 9 recognition of the intentional breadth of the statutory language
and overall approach, 2 ° and a commitment to support RICO's spirit in
"develop[ing] new methods for fighting crime.' 121 In response to argu-
ments that RICO is overbroad and over-used, the Court noted that Con-
gress, not the judiciary, has the power to remedy such defects. 122 Despite
quirement of § 1964(c) permitted private plaintiffs to use that section only against previ-
ously convicted criminal defendants. Id. Furthermore, the court determined that private
plaintiffs could bring an action under § 1964(c) only when they had suffered an injury that
RICO was designed to deter, such as a racketeering injury. Id.
114. Id. at 493. Specifically, the Court stated that Sedima's action was not barred by
the fact that Imrex and the individual defendants had not been convicted of a criminal
RICO violation or the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud. Id.
115. Id. at 495.
116. Id. at 496. The Court summarized § 1962's elements as follows: "(1) conduct (2) of
an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity." Id. (footnote omitted).
See supra notes 77-79 (discussing the elements in greater detail); infra notes 132-202 (dis-
cussing the various federal circuits approaches to the conduct requirement).
117. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497. The Court elaborated on the pattern requirement by
indicating that the pattern is equivalent to a threat of continuity of activity plus a " 'rela-
tionship which combines to produce a pattern.'" Id. at 496 n.14 (quoting S. Rep. No. 91-
617, p. 158 (1969)) (emphasis in original), The Court cited the legislative history to demon-
strate that Congress did not intend RICO to target sporadic activity. Id.
118. Id. at 497 (stating that "[t]his less restrictive reading is amply supported by our
prior cases and the general principles surrounding this statue").
119. Id.; see also supra notes 17, 87 (discussing the liberal construction clause).
120. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 498 (citing United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586-87
(1981)).
121. Id. at 498 (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26-29 (1983)).
122. Id. at 499-500. Justice White reasoned that RICO's ambiguity is attributable to the
breadth of the statutory language, rather than its application in contexts not expressly in-
tended by Congress. Id. at 499 (citing Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984)).
Justice White recognized that if the use of RICO to target legitimate businessmen rather
than "the archetypal, intimidating mobster" is improper, it is a defect inherent in the stat-
ute and its remedy lies with Congress. Id. at 499 (footnote omitted). Justice White stated,
"[ilt is not for the judiciary to eliminate the private action in situations where Congress has
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its reluctance to constrict civil RICO, the Court acknowledged that
"RICO is evolving into something quite different from the original con-
ception of its enactors.'
123
In dissent,'124 Justice Marshall and Justice Powell argued that the major-
ity opinion incorrectly construed a RICO civil action to reach "garden-
variety fraud and breach of contract cases,' 25 thereby radically altering
federal civil litigation.'26 The dissent criticized the majority's interpreta-
tion of the Act's legislative history, arguing that Congress intended prose-
cutors to use RICO as a tool to combat organized crime, with only
incidental effects in the civil context.127 The dissent contended that the
Court has a duty to interpret the statute narrowly and confine RICO's
scope to those situations intended by Congress. 28 Moreover, the dissent
found that the liberal interpretive principles enunciated in Turkette'29
were inapplicable in the civil context because the legislative statements
provided it simply because plaintiffs are not taking advantage of it in its more difficult
applications." Id. at 499-500.
123. Id. at 500; see also supra notes 13-16 (discussing the notion that civil RICO has
evolved beyond its intended statutory reach).
124. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall filed a dissent-
ing opinion in which Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Powell, joined. Justice Powell also
filed a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 503.
125. Id. at 525 (Powell, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 500-03 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall argued that the majority's
extension of § 1964(c) displaces existing federal laws and federal remedies, Id. at 502. For
example, Justice Marshall discussed that a plaintiff can bring a civil RICO action by alleg-
ing two instances of " 'fraud in the sale of securities.'" Id. at 504 (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(1) (1988)). RICO displaces federal securities laws because a plaintiff can avoid the
standing requirements imposed by federal law by alleging other predicate acts under
RICO, such as mail and wire fraud. Id. at 505. In addition, Justice Marshall recognized
that "the federal securities laws contemplate only compensatory damages and ordinarily
do not authorize recovery of attorney's fees. By invoking RICO, in contrast, a successful
plaintiff will recover both treble damages and attorney's fees." Id. at 504-05. Justice Mar-
shall noted that the lure of treble damages will lead to extortionate litigation. Id. at 504.
The serious financial implications of litigation and the threat of being labeled a racketeer
will compel civil RICO defendants to settle out of court. Id.; cf. Holmes v. Securities In-
vestor Protection Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1311, 1322 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (asserting
that a RICO claim predicated on violations of fraud in the sale of securities does not re-
quire the purchaser/seller limitation applicable to a Rule 10b-5 private action).
127. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 506 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that RICO's central pur-
pose is to combat organized criminal behavior, which now constitutes only 9% of civil
RICO cases) (citing TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 69); see also id. at 526 (Powell,
J., dissenting) (suggesting that" '[t]he reach of the statute beyond traditional mobster and
racketeer activity and comparable ongoing structured criminal enterprises, was intended to
be incidental, and only to the extent necessary to maintain the constitutionality of a statute
aimed primarily at organized crime' ") (citation omitted) (quoting TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 9, at 71-72).
128. Id. at 527 (Powell, J., dissenting).
129. See supra notes 95-107 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
broad interpretation of RICO provisions in a criminal context).
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supporting those principles were made in reference to a RICO criminal
action.' 30 Thus, the dissent concluded that the Court can and should cur-
tail the unintended application of RICO in the civil context.
131
II. SECTION 1962(c)-APPROACHES TO THE CONDUCT OR
PARTICIPATION REQUIREMENT
Federal courts have continued to struggle in interpreting and applying
the RICO provisions.'32 Section 1962(c)'s phrase, "to conduct or partici-
pate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of [the] enterprise' 33 was one
of the few aspects of RICO that had not been previously litigated before
the Supreme Court.' 34 A complete understanding of the meaning of this
phrase requires an examination of the relationship between the defend-
ant and the enterprise, and specifically, the defendant's level of activity
within that enterprise.' 35 Federal courts refer to this substantive provi-
sion of section 1962(c) in a variety of ways, including the "nexus require-
ment," the "participation requirement," and the "conduct
requirement.' 36 As one federal appellate court judge observed, "the
130. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 528-29. Justice Marshall indicated that RICO's private civil
provisions were added by the House of Representatives "almost as an afterthought" after
the Senate had passed its version of the bill. Id. at 507. Upon Senate reconsideration, the
bill passed without conference in an effort to enact RICO by the end of the term. Id. at
518-19. Justice Marshall speculated that, as a result, "the private remedy at issue here
slipped quietly into the statute, and its entrance evinces absolutely no intent to revolution-
ize the enforcement scheme, or to give undue breadth to the broadly worded provision-
provisions Congress fully expected Government enforcers to narrow." Id. at 519.
131. Id. at 523.
132. See, e.g., Sun Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 196-97 (9th Cir. 1987)
("RICO is for me (and many, if not most, of my district court colleagues) an agonizingly
difficult and confusing area of the law."); Goldman v. McMahan, Brafman, Morgan & Co.,
706 F. Supp. 256, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating that "[tjhe law surrounding the RICO statu-
tory frame is a rapidly shifting, evolving corpus, whose practical interpretation presents a
continual challenge to the courts"); see also Cassidy, Comment, supra note 76, at 469 (dis-
cussing differing approaches to RICO's conspiracy provision and noting the "continued
efforts by federal courts to interpret the sweeping, innovative language of RICO while
balancing the conflicting interpretive tensions between literalist and purposive construc-
tions of the Act"); Posner, Note, supra note 13, at 1747 (stating that federal courts have
been unable to define RICO's pattern element consistently).
133. See supra note 75 (providing the text of § 1962(c)).
134. See supra note 95 (discussing prior cases in which Supreme Court has interpreted
RICO's provisions). In Sedima, the Supreme Court discussed the elements of § 1962(c),
but did not provide further interpretive guidance. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496.
135. See generally SMITH & REED, supra note 11, § 5.04, at 5-33 (discussing the require-
ments of § 1962(c)).
136. See, e.g., Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers Local 639, 913 F.2d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(conduct or participation requirement), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2839 (1991); United States
v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522 (9th Cir.) (nexus requirement), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 866
(1988); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966 (11th
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Federal Circuits are all over the lot on this question."' 3 7 The United
States Courts of Appeals have articulated five different approaches re-
garding the level of participation that RICO requires to hold a defendant
liable under section 1962(c).' 38 Using the same legislative history, statu-
tory language, and case law, these courts have defined the legal standards
to impose RICO liability for a broad spectrum of activity, ranging from
mere participation to management and direction in the enterprise. 39
A. The Mere Relation Test
In United States v. Scotto,"4 the Second Circuit articulated the most
expansive interpretation of section 1962(c)'s participation requirement.
In this criminal case, the court evaluated the adequacy of a jury instruc-
tion, addressing the issue of whether the appellant conducted a union's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. 4 ' The trial court for-
mulated a "mere relation" approach, through which a prosecutor can sat-
isfy RICO's nexus requirement in one of two ways:' 42 through proof of a
relation between the defendant's predicate offenses and the enterprise's
affairs, or through evidence that the defendant's position within the en-
terprise enabled him to commit the predicate offenses. 4 3
Cir. 1986) (conduct requirement); Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.) (same), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983); United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983) (nexus
requirement), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984); United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47 (2d
Cir. 1980) (same), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981). Although federal courts employ differ-
ent language when discussing the substantive requirement of § 1962(c), essentially the stat-
ute requires the court to determine whether there is a substantial or meaningful connection
between the defendant's pattern of racketeering and the affairs of the enterprise. See
SMITH & REED, supra note 11, § 5.04, at 5-35 (discussing the nexus requirement and its
application by various federal circuit courts).
137. Yellow Bus Lines, 913 F.2d at 957 (Mikva, J., concurring).
138. See infra notes 140-202 and accompanying text (discussing the five different legal
standards used by the federal circuit courts).
139. See infra notes 140-57 (discussing the mere relation standard), 158-67 (discussing
the facilitation standard), 168-79 (discussing the direct/indirect approach), 180-93 (discuss-
ing the operation or management test), 194-202 (discussing the significant control
standard).
140. 641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981).
141. Id. at 54. In Scotto, the defendant, a union president, accepted several bribes
from various union member employers in exchange for reducing the amount of worker
compensation claims filed by the union. Id. at 51. The defendant requested a jury instruc-
tion that would require the jury to find that his activity " '[a]ffected the [union's] affairs...
in its essential functions.' and was 'concerned or related to the operation or management
of the enterprise.' " Id. at 54 (quoting brief of appellant).
142. Id.
143. Id. The court stated:
[Olne conducts the activities of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
when (1) one is enabled to commit the predicate offenses solely by virtue of his
position in the enterprise or involvement in or control over the affairs of the en-
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Evaluating these criteria, the Second Circuit recognized that RICO
does not qualitatively define the connection required between. the de-
fendant's activity and the defendant's involvement in the enterprise's af-
fairs. 44 In the absence of a statutory definition of this nexus
requirement, the court suggested that a broad range of relationships to
the enterprise would trigger RICO liability.1 45 Critics argue that the
Scotto court did not give sufficient consideration to the conduct element
of section 1962(c).146 The Ninth and Third Circuits, however, subse-
quently adopted the Scotto standard.1
47
terprise, or (2) the predicate offenses are related to the activities of that
enterprise.
Id. There are several critics of the Scotto standard. See, e.g., SMITH & REED, supra note
11, § 504, at 5-41 to 5-42 (indicating that the precise meaning of the second element of
Scotto's test, that predicate offenses be related to the activities of the enterprise, is not
clear); Jed S. Rakoff, Will the Supreme Court Come to Terms with RICO?, N.Y. L.J., Sept.
10, 1992, at 3, 7 (arguing that Scotto's approach "sweeps far too broadly" and is inconsis-
tent with both the structure of § 1962 and the language of subsection (c)).
144. Scotto, 641 F.2d at 54 (citing United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 613
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976)). Using the Stofsky analysis, the Scotto
court found that the nexus requirement does not require the predicate acts to further the
enterprise or play a significant role in the usual operations of the enterprise. Id. Based on
these conclusions, the Scotto court rejected the contention that a person must "solidify or
otherwise enhance his position in the enterprise through [the] commission of the predicate
violations." Id.; cf United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 990 (5th Cir. 1977) (noting that
RICO requires some "relationship between the proscribed acts and the maintenance of
union position"), vacated on other grounds, 439 U.S. 810 (1978).
145. Scotto, 641 F.2d at 54.
146. The conduct requirement of § 1962(c) requires "any person employed by or associ-
ated with any enterprise ... to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct
of such enterprise's affairs." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988). Critics argue that the Scotto for-
mulation of this substantive provision is too broad. See, e.g., Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v.
Drivers Local 639, 913 F.2d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2839 (1991). The
D.C. Circuit rejected Scotto's mere relation formulation as too lenient, because its applica-
tion could potentially result in RICO liability for "[a]ny pattern of predicate acts remotely
related to an 'enterprise,' whether committed by a mail clerk in the target enterprise or by
the C.E.O. of the enterprise's business competitor." Id. at 952. The D.C. Circuit reasoned
that "[i]f section 1962(c) can apply whenever predicate offenses are merely related to the
activities of an enterprise, then the 'participation in the conduct' element of that section
practically drops out." Id. (emphasis in original); see also supra note 143 (discussing other
criticisms of the Scotto standard).
147. See United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1544 (9th Cir.) (recognizing that
the commission of predicate acts that "stem from" or are otherwise related to the enter-
prise satisfies the RICO "nexus" or "connection" requirement), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 866
(1988). The court imposed RICO liability where the defendant's commission of a theft
related to a supremist organization's attempt to raise money. Id.; Sun Sav. & Loan Ass'n
v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 195 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that the "connection requirement is
satisfied if [the defendant] was able to commit the fraud by virtue of his position with or
work for [the enterprise] or if the fraud was related to [the enterprise's] business"). The
court found that the complaint sufficiently alleged a RICO violation because the defendant
committed several acts of mail fraud in his position as bank president and the mail fraud
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Despite Scotto's broad formulation, courts applying the Second Cir-
cuit's mere relation approach have declined to impose RICO liability
against independent accountants who perform peripheral financial serv-
ices for the enterprise.148 In Plains/Anadarko-P Ltd. Partnership v.
Coopers & Lybrand, 49 the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York dismissed a RICO claim which was based on an
accounting firm's certification of materially false financial statements.15 °
The court indicated that the conduct or participation requirement is not
satisfied "when a professional accountant enters an engagement of finite
duration and scope, undertaken for a particular client."'' Using the
Scotto test, the court concluded that the defendants did not conduct the
challenged enterprise because ordinary auditing activity did not suffi-
ciently establish one's relationship to, or position within, the enter-
prise. 52 Similarly, in Goldman v. McMahan, Brafman, Morgan & Co. ,15
the same district court dismissed a RICO claim brought by investors in a
limited partnership against the limited partnership and an accounting
firm."'54 The court stated that the plaintiff must demonstrate a greater
degree of correlation between the defendant and the enterprise than the
relationship typically encountered between a client and an accountant.'
55
The court reasoned that an accounting firm's performance of ordinary
related to the bank's activities. Id. United States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194, 200 (3rd
Cir.) (interpreting Scotto as standing for the proposition that '[ilt is only when the predi-
cate acts are unrelated to the enterprise or the actor's association with it that the nexus
element is missing, and consequently there is no RICO violation"), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1071 (1982). The court found that the defendant violated RICO when he conducted his
union office through racketeering activity by accepting bribes in exchange for overlooking
violations of the collective bargaining agreement. Id.; see also Bank v. Wolk, 918 F.2d 418,
424 (3rd Cir. 1990) (affirming the dismissal of a RICO claim for the failure to satisfy the
nexus requirement where the complaint did not allege a connection between the enterprise
and the charge that the defendant "'illegally financed a strawman' ").
148. Edward Brodsky, RICO Liability of Accountants and Lawyers, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 11,
1992, at 9 (stating that "despite the Second Circuit's expansive dicta in Scotto, an outside
accounting firm will not be liable [under RICO] if all it does is perform typical accounting
functions").
149. 658 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
150. Id. at 240 ("The claim attempts to squeeze an independent professional auditing
engagement into the ferment of the RICO statutes, [which] ... requires more than loose
adjectives and characterizations to connect activities of an independent professional audi-
tor with frauds committed by the enterprise being audited.").
151. Id. ("The auditing and reporting acts of the accountants, without more, would not
establish a connection to the enterprise or the pattern requirements of the statutes.").
152. Id. (citing United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 961 (1981)).
153. 706 F. Supp. 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
154. Id. at 256-57.
155. Id. at 262.
1994] 1049
Catholic University Law Review
auditing activity was not a proper basis for a RICO claim.156 Therefore,
the court could not distinguish the case from Plains/Andarko.57
B. The Facilitation Test
In United States v. Cauble,15 s the Fifth Circuit developed a "facilitation
and effect" test, which closely parallels the Second Circuit's mere relation
test, to assess whether the government established the nexus requirement
of section 1962(c). 159 As a result of the perceived overbreadth of Scotto's
language, 60 the Cauble court modified the Scotto test to incorporate a
more restrictive standard.1 6 ' In doing so, the Fifth Circuit stated that the
nexus element is satisfied when the commission of the predicate acts is
facilitated by the defendant's position in the enterprise and when those
acts affect the enterprise.' 62 The court explained that a defendant's pred-
icate acts could affect the enterprise directly or indirectly, 63 and recog-
nized that there was no requirement that the acts must benefit or advance
the affairs of the enterprise.
The Cauble court concluded that the government satisfied the facilita-
tion aspect of the nexus requirement by demonstrating that the defend-
ant, a successful businessman, provided funds and other assets used in a
smuggling operation by virtue of his position in the enterprise.' 64 The
court also concluded that, through the defendant's assistance, the smug-
gling operation provided substantial financial resources to the enterprise,
156. Id.
157. Id. at 261.
158. 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984).
159. Id. at 1332-33. In Cauble, a wealthy Texas businessman was charged with com-
manding the " 'Cowboy Mafia,' a loosely-knit group responsible for importing and distrib-
uting over 147,000 pounds of marijuana" during a two year period. Id. at 1329. The jury
found the defendant guilty of the substantive RICO violations, including § 1962(c), and the
trial judge ordered forfeiture of his interest in Cauble Enterprises. Id. at 1329-30.
160. See supra note 143 (stating the Scotto standard).
161. Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1332 (restricting the nexus requirement "because the enter-
prise-racketeering nexus should be distinct from the defendant-racketeering connection").
162. Id. at 1332-33. The Cauble court set out a three prong test, requiring that "(1) the
defendant has in fact committed the racketeering acts as alleged; (2) the defendant's posi-
tion in the enterprise facilitated his commission of the racketeering acts, and (3) the predi-
cate acts had some effect on the lawful enterprise." Id. (footnote omitted).
163. Id. at 1333 n.24 ("The effect may be direct, such as the deposit of money in the
enterprise's bank account, or indirect, such as the retention of the enterprise's existing
clients.").
164. Id. at 1341. The court found that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury
to conclude that "none of the acts of travel [used for the smuggling operations] would have
occurred but for [the defendant's] ability to dispatch the Cauble Enterprises [sic] airplane
and to use Cauble Enterprises' assets to pay for commercial flights." Id.
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thereby satisfying the affect aspect of the nexus requirement. 165 The
Sixth and Seventh Circuits subsequently adopted the Cauble
formulation."6
C. Direct/Indirect Test
In Bank of America Nat. Trust & Say. Ass'n. v. Touche Ross,' 67 the
Eleventh Circuit announced another liberal interpretation of section
1962(c)'s conduct requirement. The court examined the application of
section 1962(c) to certified public accountants who prepared audited fi-
nancial statements and unqualified reports. 68 Here, the court reversed
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia's
dismissal of the RICO claim, finding that the independent auditors assist-
ance in the preparation and dissemination of false financial statements
satisfied the participation element of section 1962(c). 169 The court con-
strued conduct to mean "the performance of those activities necessary or
helpful to the operation of the enterprise. '"170
The Eleventh Circuit based its statutory analysis on the "directly or
indirectly" language of section 1962(c).171 The court reasoned that this
language contradicted the defendant's assertion that Congress imposed a
conduct requirement in an attempt to limit the application of civil
165. Id. (noting that a jury could conclude that the successful smuggling operation re-
sulted in large cash deposits to the enterprise's bank account).
166. Overnite Transp. Co. v. Truck Drivers Local 705, 904 F.2d 391, 394 (7th Cir. 1990)
(affirming the dismissal of a RICO claim where the union's activities did not facilitate the
racketeering activities); United States v. Pieper, 854 F.2d 1020, 1026 (7th Cir. 1988) (find-
ing evidence sufficient to support a RICO claim by virtue of the defendant's position
within the union enterprise); United States v. Horak, 833 F.2d 1235, 1239 (7th Cir. 1987)
(applying the Cauble standard to affirm a criminal conviction and indicating that the term
"conduct" does not mean to control or manage); United States v. Qaoud, 777 F.2d 1105
(6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1098, 1115 (1986) (citing Cauble for the proposition
that there must be a nexus between the pattern of racketeering activity and the RICO
enterprise to satisfy § 1962(c)); United States v. Blackwood, 768 F.2d 131 (7th Cir. 1985)
(adopting the Cauble formulation).
167. 782 F.2d 966 (11th Cir. 1986).
168. Id. at 968. The financial statements prepared by the accountants were a prerequi-
site to the execution of a credit agreement between their client and a bank. Id. The client
filed for bankruptcy two years after signing the financing agreement, and then subse-
quently settled with the bank, resulting in a loss of approximately $16.7 million to the bank.
Id.
169. Id. at 970. The court did not address the merits of the defendant's argument that
independent auditors do not participate in an enterprise's affairs, because questions of fact
are not addressed in a motion to dismiss. Id.
170. Id. (noting that the preparation of false financial statements promoted the enter-
prise because it induced the bank to approve the credit agreement).
171. Id.; see also supra note 75 (providing the full text of § 1962(c)).
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RICO.'7 2 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the accounting firm's
argument that it could avoid RICO liability unless the court found that its
participation was significant.' 7 3 The court suggested that the language
demonstrates that section 1962(c) was designed to apply to a broader
class of defendants.' 74 This broader class of RICO defendants includes
individuals participating in the enterprise's affairs as "insiders," as well as
those "outsiders" who are merely associated with the enterprise.
1 75
The primary criticism of the Eleventh Circuit's formulation is that it
fails to account for the inclusion of the word "conduct" in section
1962(c)'s participation requirement. 176 The Eleventh Circuit supported
its position by stating that it did not require a conduct element in criminal
RICO cases, 1 77 and therefore would not require it in civil RICO cases
172. Bank of Am., 782 F.2d at 970.
173. Id.
174. Id. ("It is not necessary that a RICO defendant participate in the management or
operation of the enterprise.").
175. Id. The Court indicated that " 'the RICO net is woven tightly to trap even the
smallest fish, those peripherally involved,' " Id. (quoting United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d
880, 903 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978)); see also United States v. Watch-
maker, 761 F.2d 1459, 1476 (11th Cir. 1985) (using similar language to describe RICO's
breadth), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1100 (1986).
176. See Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers Local 639, 913 F.2d 948, 953-55 (D.C. Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2839 (1991). The District of Columbia Circuit found the
decision problematic for several reasons. First, the court interpreted the Eleventh Circuit
formulation as a "strict benefits" test, which had been rejected by other federal circuit
courts. Id. at 953; see also United States v. Kovic, 684 F.2d 512 (7th Cir.) (rejecting a
benefits analysis), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 972 (1982); United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174
(4th Cir. 1981), (finding that participation does not require the defendant's actions to bene-
fit the enterprise), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2257 (1991). Second, the District of Columbia
Circuit disagreed that the "directly or indirectly" language of § 1962(c) was inconsistent
with an operation or management approach. Yellow Bus Lines, 913 F.2d at 953. The Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit stated that outsiders are not eliminated as potential RICO de-
fendants under an operation or management standard when that standard "can as easily be
applied to-for example-an organized crime boss who pulls the strings of a corporation
through a puppet president as it can to the corporation president himself." Id. Finally, the
District of Columbia Circuit argued that, by ignoring the "conduct" language of § 1962 (c),
the decision circumvented Congress' intent to proscribe a greater degree of participation
through the substantive provision of the subsection. Id. at 953-54.
177. Bank of Am., 782 F.2d at 970 (supporting a broad interpretation of § 1962(c) by
referring to the Fifth Circuit's statement in Elliott, that RICO can catch "even the smallest
fish"). See Watchmaker, 761 F.2d at 1476 (finding sufficient evidence to support the finding
that two members of the "Outlaws" participated in the affairs of a motorcycle gang by
engaging in acts of drug dealing and extortion); Elliott, 571 F.2d at 899-900. In Elliott, the
court failed to mention conduct, but stated:
[b]y committing arson, actively assisting a car theft ring, fencing thousands of dol-
lars worth of goods stolen from interstate commerce, murdering a key witness,
and dealing in narcotics, [two members of a loosely connected criminal enter-
prises] directly and indirectly participated in the enterprise's affairs through a pat-
tern ... of racketeering activity.
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because the substantive requirements of section 1962(c) are the same for
both actions.
178
D. The Operation or Management Test
In Bennett v. Berg,179 the Eighth Circuit articulated a restrictive inter-
pretation of the participation requirement, commonly known as the oper-
ation or management test.180  In Bennett, members of a retirement
community claimed that certain accountants and attorneys, among
others, 181 violated RICO by fraudulently promoting a retirement commu-
nity ("the Village").' 82 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants made
materially false statements concerning the financial health of the Vil-
lage.'83 The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
plaintiffs failed to allege the existence of an enterprise." 4 The Eighth
Circuit heard the case en banc, 185 and affirmed a panel opinion reversing
the district court's dismissal of the RICO claim.' 86
The Eighth Circuit articulated the operation or management test to
guide the district court on remand. 87 The court questioned the plaintiff's
factual claim that each defendant participated in the conduct of the affairs
of the enterprise in violation of section 1962(c). 8 8 The court indicated
that an individual's mere participation in committing fraud in connection
with the enterprise is insufficient to satisfy the requisite degree of partici-
pation required by the Act.'89 The Bennett court concluded that a plain-
tiff must prove that the defendant engaged in "some participation in the
Id.
178. Bank of Am., 782 F.2d at 970 n.2 ("Although our prior decisions refusing to im-
pose a 'conduct' requirement occurred in criminal context, all of them were interpretations
of § 1962(c), which [also] provides [a] cause of action for civil RICO suits.").
179. 710 F.2d 1361 (en banc) (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983).
180. See, e.g., Yellow Bus Lines, 913 F.2d at 953 (crediting Bennett with the formulation
of the operation or management test).
181. Bennett, 710 F.2d at 1363. This case raised the issue of professional liability in the
context of RICO. The defendants included Kenneth Berg, who was the founder of the
Village, the Village itself, the Village's former accountants, and two attorneys formerly
employed by various defendants. Id.
182. The Village consisted of approximately 2,500 residents. Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d
1053, 1056 (8th Cir. 1982).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1056. Count I of the complaint alleged that all defendants had participated
and conspired to participate in a pattern of racketeering activity through mail fraud. Id. at
1057.
185. Bennett, 710 F.2d at 1361.
186. Id. at 1365.
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operation or management of the enterprise itself" to establish RICO lia-
bility.190 The en banc court, however, did not provide any statutory or
legislative support for this formulation. 91 Furthermore, the court de-
clined to reject the analysis of the earlier panel decision, which acknowl-
edged the breadth of RICO and the court's lack of authority to limit the
statute's reach. 192
E. The Significant Control Test
The District of Columbia Circuit adopted a more restrictive form of the
operation or management test in Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers Local
Union 639.19' There, the court determined whether a labor union's or-
ganization of a strike against an employer rose to the degree of conduct
or participation sufficient to impose RICO liability under section
1962(c). 1'94 After reviewing the various federal circuit interpretations of
section 1962(c)'s participation element, 195 the court held that a striking
union does not participate in the enterprise's affairs when it engages in a
pattern of racketeering activity resulting from strike-related violence.' 96
The Yellow Bus Lines court reasoned that the operation or manage-
ment test came closest to the true meaning of the statutory language and
intent of Congress.' 97 The court noted that if Congress had intended to
federalize labor and other areas of law under the RICO statute, it would
have indicated that intent "clearly and unequivocally."' 98 In an effort to
190. Id.; compare id. with United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1375-76 (4th Cir.)
(concluding that the district court correctly interpreted § 1962(c) to require some involve-
ment in the operation or management of the business because the legislative history re-
peatedly cited the word "operation" to describe the purpose of the subsection), aff'd on
other grounds, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980). The Mandel
court held that the transfer of a legitimate business to the defendant as a payoff for fraudu-
lent activity did not satisfy § 1962(c)'s requirement of conducting or participating in the
conduct of the business through the predicate crimes. Id. at 1347.
191. Bennett, 710 F.2d at 1364.
192. Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1063-64 (8th Cir. 1982) (rejecting many of the
arguments criticizing RICO, including the federalization of some state claims, because
Congress anticipated RICO's broad scope).
193. 913 F.2d 948, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2839 (1991).
194. Id. at 949. The union conducted a four day strike for recognition against Yellow
Bus Lines, Inc., which later asserted a RICO claim against the union and Woodward, the
union's business agent and trustee. Id. at 950.
195. Id. at 952-53.
196. Id. at 956 (holding that the Union's activities associated with the strike "do not
constitute the sort of hijacking of [the enterprise], in the form of acquiring and exercising
control over [the enterprise's] affairs, that the RICO statute was designed to combat").
197. Id. at 954.
198. Id. at 954-55. First, the court concluded that the Bennett standard is the best ap-
proach "[b]ecause 'conducting' connotes more than merely 'participating' in [the enter-
prise's] affairs." Id. at 954. "Conduct" represents the idea of management, direction, or
1054
Professional Liability Under RICO
constrict the scope of civil RICO liability, the court placed greater em-
phasis on the requirement that a defendant exercise "significant control"
over or within an enterprise. 199 The court stated that a defendant must
participate in the direction or the control of the business' agenda to sat-
isfy the control element of 1962(c). 2"° The District of Columbia Circuit's
formulation, therefore, restricts the Bennett operation or management
test by requiring that the plaintiff show the defendant's ability to "run[]
the show.",
201
III. REvEs. A MODERN APPROACH TO RICO JURISPRUDENCE
In Reves v. Ernst & Young,20 2 the Court, for the first time, addressed
the phrase "to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct
of [an] enterprise's affairs" in Section 1962(c).2 °3 The Court considered
whether this language required courts to impose RICO liability only after
finding that the defendant actively engaged in the affairs of the enterprise
itself.204 In a 7-2 decision, the Court affirmed the decisions of both the
United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas2°5 and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit2 6 by holding
that a court must find that the defendant participated in the operation or
management of the enterprise itself to impose liability under section
1962(c).2°7 In doing so, the Supreme Court adopted the Eighth Circuit's
other exercise of control such that one must participate in the "running of the show." Id.
Second, the court rejected a broader interpretation of the participation requirement be-
cause it would "federalize broad areas of state common law of contracts, and 'RICOize'
broad areas of labor law and other federal laws governing relationships not readily identifi-
able as being within the enacting intent of Congress." Id. at 955.
199. Id. at 954 (rejecting the argument that outsiders are precluded from liability under
this formulation because "[tihe crucial question is not whether a person is an insider or an
outsider, but whether and to what extent that person controls the course of the enterprise's
business").
200. Id. (stating that RICO liability may be imposed where a defendant either "partici-
pates in directing the enterprise toward its preexisting goals or participates in exercising
control over an enterprise so as to reset its goals").
201. Id.; see also supra notes 180-93 and accompanying text (discussing Bennett's oper-
ation or management standard).
202. 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993).
203. Id. at 1166 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988)). See supra note 95 (discussing the
Court's previous interpretations of various RICO provisions).
204. Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1166 (stating that "[t]he question presented is whether one
must participate in the operation or management of the enterprise itself to be subject to
liability under this provision"). See Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361, 1364 (answering this
question affirmatively).
205. Robertson v. White, 113 F.R.D. 20 (W.D. Ark. 1986).
206. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310, 1339-40 (8th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 113 S.
Ct. 1163 (1993).
207. Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1172.
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operation or management test as the proper legal standard in determin-
ing the point at which liability will attach under section 1962(c). 2 8 By
applying the operation or management test to Arthur Young's activi-
ties,2°9 the Court concluded that the accountant's actions did not rise to
the requisite level of participation to incur RICO liability.210 This restric-
tive application of the operation or management test may effectively
eliminate the use of RICO as a weapon against independent professionals
as a class of defendants.211
A. The Majority Opinion-Adopting the "Operation
or Management" Test
The majority analyzed RICO's language to determine the scope of the
statute and to ascertain the meaning of the provision," 'to conduct or par-
ticipate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's af-
fairs.' ,212 First, the majority reasoned that it should interpret the
meaning of the word "conduct," uniformly throughout section 1962(c).213
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, rejected the petitioner's con-
tention that "conduct" means "to carry on," since such a broad reading
would encompass almost any involvement with the affairs of the enter-
214prise. a Rather, the context of the phrase suggests that "conduct," when
used as both a noun and a verb in section 1962(c), implies some degree of
direction. 215 The majority reasoned that if no element of direction was
imported into the phrase, section 1962(c) would read to "participate, di-
rectly or indirectly in [an] enterprise's affairs," and the use of "conduct"
as a noun would be unnecessary.21 6
208. Id. at 1170.
209. See supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text (discussing Arthur Young's
activities).
210. Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1173-74.
211. See infra notes 288-302 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of the
Reves decision and the future application of § 1962(c) to professionals).
212. Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1169 (citing United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580
(1981)). Turkette explained that the statutory language is conclusive if it is unambiguous
and a legislative intent to the contrary has not been stated. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580.
213. Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1169 (stating that "it seems reasonable to give each use a
similar construction") (citing Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986)).
214. Id.
215. Id. (recognizing that the dissent agrees "that, when 'conduct' is used as a verb, 'it is
plausible to find in it a suggestion of control' "). Id. (quoting Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1174
(Souter, J., dissenting)).
216. Id. at 1169. The majority stated that "Congress could easily have written 'partici-
pate, directly or indirectly, in [an] enterprise's affairs,' but it chose to repeat the word
'conduct.'" Id. (alteration in original).
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The majority then analyzed the meaning of the word "participate"
within the context of section 1962(c).217 It determined that the word has
a narrower meaning than to "aid and abet," as suggested by the petition-
ers.218 The Court inferred the parameters of the term by examining what
Congress did and did not explicitly include in the subsection. 219 The ma-
jority concluded that Congress intended the word "participate" to mean
"take part in," an interpretation consistent with the common understand-
ing of the term.220 By combining the definitions of "conduct" and "par-
ticipate," the majority concluded that an individual must take part in
directing the affairs of the enterprise to trigger civil RICO liability under
section 1962(c).22'
Moreover, the majority indicated that the "directly or indirectly" lan-
guage of section 1962(c) will not limit the application of the operation or
management test to individuals in a formal position within the enter-
222 Nrwlprise. Nor will its application be limited to those who have significant
control over its affairs.223 Courts can find outsiders liable under section
1962(c) if they participate in the operation or management of the enter-
prise itself.224 The majority contemplated that individuals outside the en-
terprise may be subject to RICO liability if they conduct the affairs of the
217. Id. at 1170.
218. Id. The majority recognized that "participate" has been characterized as a word of
breadth. Id. (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21-22 (1983)). See infra note
268 (discussing the Russello decision's directive for interpreting RICO provisions). The
majority, nonetheless, rejected "aid or abet" as an interpretation of "participate," because
it is too broad and " 'comprehends all assistance rendered by words, acts, encouragement,
support, or presence.' " Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1170 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 68
(6th ed. 1990)).
219. Id. For example, the inclusion of the term "participate" indicates that the phrase
has a broader meaning than the conduct of affairs. Id. at 1169. Similarly, the inclusion of
the term "conduct" twice in the phrase "'to conduct or participate ... in the conduct of
[the enterprise's] affairs'" infers an interpretation that is narrower than participation. Id.
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988)).
220. Id. at 1170 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DIcrIONARY 1646 (1976)).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1173.
223. Id. at 1170. The majority rejected the District of Columbia Circuit's formulation
that § 1962(c) requires an individual to have " 'significant control over or within an enter-
prise.'" Id. at 1170 n.4 (quoting Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers Local Union 639, 913
F.2d 948, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2839 (1991)) (emphasis omitted); see
also supra notes 194-202 and accompanying text (discussing the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit's significant control formulation). The majority rejected the petitioner's contention
that the operation or management test is limited to upper management, and stated that
"[an enterprise is 'operated' not just by upper management but also by lower-rung partici-
pants in the enterprise who are under the direction of upper management ... [which in-
clude those] who exert control over it as, for example, by bribery." Id. at 1173.
224. Id. at 1172-73.
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enterprise, rather than their own affairs.225 Only those who operate com-
pletely outside the enterprise will avoid RICO liability under section
1962(c). 226
The majority found support for the operation or management test in
RICO's legislative history.227 The majority asserted that the numerous
legislative history references to "operation" and "management" con-
firmed its statutory analysis of section 1962(c). 228 For example, the ma-
jority cited the views of the Department of Justice on a revised "RICO"
bill proposed by the Senate. 229 The Department of Justice praised the
revised legislation because the " 'criminal provisions of the bill contained
in Section 1962 are broad enough to cover most of the methods by which
ownership, control and operation of business concerns are acquired.' ,230
The majority concluded that the legislative history illuminates Congress'
225. Id. at 1173.
226. Id.
227. Part IV-A of the opinion is dedicated to the majority's analysis of the legislative
history. Id. at 1170-72. Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas joined in the majority opinion,
but they did not join in Part IV-A. Id. at 1166.
228. Id. at 1170-72.
229. Id. at 1170-71. Senators Hruska and McClellan introduced S-1861 as a revision of
their original bill, S-1623, to reflect the statute's expanded purpose " 'to prohibit the infil-
tration or management of legitimate organizations by racketeering activity or the proceeds
of racketeering activity.'" Id. at 1171 (quoting S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1962 (b)-
(c) (1969)) (emphasis in original). S-1861 later became §§ 1962(b) and (c) of RICO. Id.
(citing G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett
v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 264 n.76 (1982)).
230. Id. at 1171 (quoting Measures Related to Organized Crime: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Criminals and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., 387 (1969) (statement of Will Wilson, Assistant United States Attorney
General) (emphasis omitted). The majority made additional references to operation and
management. Id. at 1171-72. S-1861 eventually became Title IX of the Organized Crime
Control Act. Id. at 1171. House and Senate reports accompanying the bill describe this
provision as "proscribing the operation of any enterprise engaged in interstate commerce
through a 'pattern of racketeering activity.'" Id. at 1172. (citing H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess., at 35 (1970); S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 34 (1969)) (emphasis
omitted). Moreover, on the floor of Congress, subsection (c) was consistently referred to
as prohibiting the operation of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. Id.
at 1171. The Court also cited the remarks of individual members of Congress to support
this proposition. Id. at 1171 n.7 (indicating Senator Byrd understood subsection (c) to
require an individual "to acquire or operate such businesses by racketeering methods")
(quoting 116 CONG. REC. 607 (1970)); Id. (indicating Senator McClellan understood sub-
section (c) to require an individual "to operate such a business by racketeering methods)
(quoting 116 CONG. REc. 607 (1970)); Id. (indicating Senator Dole understood subsection
(c) to require an individual to "acquire or operate such businesses by racketeering meth-
ods") (quoting 116 CONG. REC. 607 (1970)); Id. (indicating Representative Steiger under-
stood subsection (c) to require an individual to "use ... specified racketeering methods to
acquire or operate commercial organizations") (quoting 116 CONG. REC. 607 (1970)).
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intent to limit RICO liability to individuals participating in "the acquisi-
tion or operation of an enterprise." 23'
Furthermore, the majority firmly rejected the congressional mandate to
construe RICO liberally where both the congressional intent and the stat-
utory language are clear.232 The liberal construction clause, the majority
noted, facilitates RICO's broad remedial purposes by "ensur[ing] that
Congress' intent is not frustrated by an overly narrow reading of the stat-
ute. 233 In the absence of statutory ambiguity, however, courts should
not use the liberal construction mandate to expand the scope of RICO's
provisions beyond their intended parameters.234
The majority concluded that Arthur Young's failure to inform the Co-
op's board of directors of its potential insolvency did not rise to the level
of operation or management of the enterprise.235 Arthur Young pre-
pared the Co-op's financial statements and assessed the value of the Co-
op's investment in the gasohol plant.236 Furthermore, the majority re-
jected the dissent's argument, based on the professional standards
adopted by the accounting profession, that the creation of financial state-
ments is a managerial function.237 The majority found that such stan-
dards do not define "management" for purposes of section 1962(c).238
Finally, the majority noted that both the district and circuit courts applied
the proper legal standard, the operation or management test, in granting
summary judgment in favor of Arthur Young. 2"9
231. Id. at 1171. The majority found further support for this limitation in Senator Mc-
Clellan's reassurance to RICO critics that appropriate restrictions were included in the
substantive provisions of § 1962. Id. at 1172. He stated: " 'Unless an individual not only
commits such a crime [a predicate act] but engages in a pattern of such violations, and uses
that pattern to obtain or operate an interest in an interstate business, he is not made sub-
ject to proceedings under Title IX.'" Id. (quoting 116 CONG. REC. 607 (1970)).
232. Id. (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 492 n.10 (1985)); see also
supra note 119 (discussing the Court's directive in Sedima to liberally construe RICO pur-
suant to the liberal construction clause).
233. Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1172.
234. Id. at 1172 (stating that the purpose of the clause is "to ensure that Congress'
intent is not frustrated by an overly narrow reading of the statute, but it is not an invitation
to apply RICO to new purposes that Congress never intended").
235. Id. at 1174.
236. Id.; see also supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text (discussing Arthur Young's
involvement with the Co-op).
237. Id. at 1173. The dissent argued that "financial statements are management's re-
sponsibility." Id. at 1176 (quoting the Code of Professional Conduct developed by the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)).
238. Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1173-74.
239. Id. at 1173.
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B. The Dissent
In dissent, Justice Souter, joined by Justice White, rejected both the
operation or management test and its application to Arthur Young's in-
volvement in the Co-op.240 First, the dissent analyzed the word "con-
duct" and found that it is a term of breadth that is not restricted by an
element of direction or control.241 The dissent supported its conclusion
by suggesting that when the term is used as a verb, its leadership or direc-
tive aspect is often obscured.242 Rather, the breadth of the term, the dis-
sent observed, is demonstrated by the context and structure of the full
subsection.243 The dissent argued that the subsection's language is
designed to include individuals "associated" with an enterprise, whose
conduct may be "indirect.", 244 Therefore, the majority's restrictive use of
the operation or management test precludes Congress's intent to reach
sub-management level associates and indirect participants in the enter-
prise.245 The dissent rejected the majority's reliance on "congressional
shorthand" in the legislative history, which referred to the term "opera-
tion" in regard to section 1962(c), because the references do not demon-
strate that Congress intended to limit the subsection's application
exclusively to those operating or managing an enterprise.246 Since statu-
tory ambiguity exists, the dissent argued, the liberal construction clause
should control the issue.2 "7 The liberal construction clause mandates that
the more inclusive definition of conduct should prevail, unlimited by an
element of direction or control.248
Despite its rejection of the majority's statutory interpretation, the dis-
sent considered the application of the operation or management test to
Arthur Young's involvement with the Co-op. 2 4 9 The dissent recognized
240. Id. at 1174 (Souter, J., dissenting).
241. Id. at 1175 (stating that the term has a "long arm, unlimited by any requirement to
prove that the activity includes an element of direction").
242. Id. at 1174. As an example of this proposition, Justice Souter cites "an investiga-
tion is conducted by all those who take part in it." Id. (quoting 3 OXFORD ENGLISH Dic-
TIONARY 691 (2d ed. 1989)) (emphasis omitted).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1174-75.
245. Id. The dissent asserted that the full context of the term defeats the majority's
restrictive interpretation of the intended meaning of the word "conduct." Id.
246. Id. at 1175 n.1. The dissent suggested that "operation" can mean both "carrying
forward" or "carrying out" and thus, to import a control element is an overly restrictive
interpretation of the subsection. Id.
247. Id. (stating that the clause is an "express admonition" to interpret RICO broadly
and a mandate which the Court has recognized in the past) (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1985)).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1175.
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that traditional auditing activity does not implicate RICO.25 ° However,
the creation of financial statements, the dissent argued, is not traditional
auditing activity.25' It is a managerial function which triggers the RICO
provisions.252 According to the dissent, Arthur Young clearly departed
from its role as an independent auditor by creating financial statements
that were the responsibility of management.253 Arthur Young "crossed
the line separating 'outside' auditors from 'inside' financial managers.,
254
The dissent found that Arthur Young used its position to adopt a "blatant
fiction" by concluding that the Co-op owned the gasohol plant on the
date that construction commenced, when in fact a court decree indicated
that the plant was acquired in 1980.255 Thus, Arthur Young fraudulently
maintained the appearance of the Co-op's solvency and did not share this
information with the Co-op's board of directors.256 On the basis of these
facts, the dissent concluded that RICO liability is appropriate.
IV. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE OPERATION OR MANAGEMENT TEST
The Supreme Court in Reves correctly interpreted section 1962(c) to
require a defendant to participate in either the operation or management
of the enterprise's affairs.257 Given the alternative of an expansive articu-
250. Id. The dissent observed that traditional auditing activity is limited to the expres-
sion of an" 'opinion on [the client's] financial statements.'" Id. at 1176 (citing the Code of
Professional Conduct developed by AICPA).
251. Id. at 1175.
252. Id. at 1175-76. This distinction is described by the auditors code:
"[Tihe financial statements are management's responsibility. The auditor's re-
sponsibility is to express an opinion on the financial statements. Management is
responsible for adopting sound accounting policies and for establishing and main-
taining an internal control structure that will, among other things, record, process,
summarize, and report financial data that is consistent with management's asser-
tions embodied in the financial statements .... The independent auditor may
make suggestions about the form or content of the financial statements or draft
them, in whole or in part, based on information from management's accounting
system."
Id. at 1176 (quoting CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES,
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1 § 110.02 (AICPA) (1982)).
253. Id. at 1178-80. The dissent rejected the majority's contention that Arthur Young
relied on White Flame's 1980 financial statements, which were prepared by the Co-op's
previous accountants who were convicted of tax fraud, in valuing the gasohol plant. Id. at
1167, 1176. Although Arthur Young had questions regarding the valuation, it did not con-
sult management, and it essentially "invented" the cost figure of the gasohol plant. Id. at
1176.
254. Id. at 1178.
255. Id. at 1177 n.5; see also supra notes 39-47 (discussing Arthur Young's valuation of
the gasohol plant).
256. Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1176-77.
257. See infra notes 259-92 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the operation
or management test is supported by the statutory language, congressional intent, and pol-
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lation of section 1962(c)'s participation requirement, the Court's adop-
tion of a more stringent standard is both appropriate and necessary. The
operation or management test is consistent with the plain language of the
statute, the broad remedial purposes enunciated in the Act, and the Con-
gressional intent set forth in the Act's legislative history.258 Moreover,
Reves marks a necessary departure from the Court's perceived movement
to adopt the more expansive interpretation of the RICO provision at is-
sue.259 Reves also instructs that the liberal construction clause is not an
invitation to apply RICO to situations unintended by its enactors. 260 Fi-
nally, the operation or management test provides clarity and predictabil-
ity to the statute by defining the contours of civil RICO liability in
commercial disputes.
261
A. Consistency with RICO's Intent and Purpose
The operation or management test is consistent with RICO's broad re-
medial purposes and legislative history.262 The majority in Reves recog-
icy); see also Brief for AICPA in Support of Respondent at 9, Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113
S. Ct. 1163 (1993) (No. 91-886). The Institute notes the significance of a proper interpreta-
tion and states:
This Court's well-founded expressions of concern regarding the use of RICO in
garden-variety fraud cases and ordinary commercial disputes involving respected
business persons and firms make it essential that section 1962(c)-RICO's most
commonly invoked proscriptive provision-be interpreted and applied in accord-
ance with its plain language, legislative history and structure [which is consistent
with an operation or management standard].
Id.
258. See supra note 265 (discussing the legislative history and Congress' indication to
confine § 1962(c)'s application to persons operating, acquiring, or directing the RICO en-
terprise); see also Jed S. Rakoff, Will the Supreme Court Come to Terms with RICO?, N.Y.
L.J., Sept. 10, 1992, at 3 (citing legislative statements in both the House and Senate which
describe § 1962(c)'s intended application to individuals corruptly operating an enterprise
and managers conducting the affairs of a business).
259. See supra note 95 (demonstrating the Supreme Court's historic and consistent re-
luctance to limit the application of RICO); see also supra note 37 (indicating that the
departure from a liberal construction of RICO is perhaps limited to Reves).
260. See Ingber, Note, supra note 12, at S378 n.184 (stating that Reves is a seminal
decision "because it represents one of the first times the Supreme Court has limited
RICO's application by side-stepping RICO's 'liberal construction' clause which directs the
Court to interpret RICO's provisions liberally"). Although Reves directly addressed the
issue, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that the liberal construction clause can be
invoked to apply RICO to situations unintended by Congress. Reves v. Ernst & Young,
113 S. Ct. 1163, 1172 (1993).
261. See AICPA Brief at 25-30, Reves (No. 91-886) (asserting that the operation or
management test will clarify civil RICO's boundaries and will address essential policy con-
cerns "raised by an expansive view of RICO liability").
262. See infra notes 265-67 (demonstrating that RICO application is consistent with
RICO's legislative history). Ironically, most RICO actions are private, civil cases, yet Con-
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nized that Congress understood the substantive provisions of section
1962(c) to require a heightened level of participation.263 The numerous
references in the legislative history to the operation and management of
an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity reflect this under-
standing.2  While these references are not dispositive,265 the operation
or management test is consistent with the plain language Congress chose
to define section 1962(c)'s substantive provisions.266
The Supreme Court has instructed courts to begin their analyses by
examining the language of the statute to interpret RICO's provisions.267
A more expansive interpretation of the participation requirement would
eliminate the term "conduct" from the provision.268 While the operation
or management test restricts the scope of activity subject to RICO liabil-
ity, it is broad enough to embrace a wide range of criminal conduct in
gress passed RICO's private remedy with little to no debate. In Sedima, the Second Cir-
cuit stated:
The legislative history of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 gives little
hint of the intended scope of private action under civil RICO.... The decision to
add a civil private damages provision was made by a House subcommittee at the
behest of Representative Sam Steiger and the American Bar Association. The
addition was not considered an important one, a remarkable fact which in itself
indicates that Congress did not intend the section to have the extraordinary im-
pact claimed for it. Indeed, when the Judiciary Committee initially introduced
the amended bill, it did not even announce to the House that it had made the
addition.
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 489-90 (2d Cir. 1984) (footnotes omitted),
rev'd 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
263. Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1170.
264. Id. (discussing the legislative debates on RICO and finding that the enactors con-
sistently discussed § 1962(c) as applying to those individuals operating or managing an
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity); see also United States v. Mandel, 591
F.2d 1347, 1375 (4th Cir. 1979) (reviewing the legislative history of the Act and noting "the
repeated use of the word 'operation' in describing the purpose of § 1962(c)"), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 961 (1980).
265. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591 (1981) (indicating that it is improper to
make a negative inference from congressional statements in the legislative history that
limit the activities embraced by RICO).
266. See supra notes 213-27 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's analysis
of the text of § 1962(c) and its compatibility with the operation or management test).
267. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497-98; Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 20 (1983) (in-
structing that "[i]n determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language. If the
statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence 'of a clearly expressed legislative intent
to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.' ") (quoting
Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580).
268. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (criticizing the Eleventh Circuit's for-
mulation of § 1962(c)'s participation standard, which merely required the defendant's ac-
tivities to be necessary or helpful to the operation of the enterprise).
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addition to the criminal activities of individuals inside the enterprise.269
Individuals outside the enterprise are included so long as their activities
are significant enough to direct the affairs of the business.270 Arguably,
Sedima S271 instruction to interpret RICO broadly,272 despite reserva-
tions that RICO is embracing unintended situations,273 is inconsistent
with Reves' more restrictive interpretation of conduct.274 However, as
Reves suggests, the liberal construction clause may not be invoked to ap-
ply RICO to situations not contemplated by Congress.275
Courts and commentators have argued about precisely which situations
Congress contemplated as being within the purview of civil RICO.27 6
This is perhaps the heart of the RICO debate. Despite this uncertainty,
there are many persuasive policy arguments in favor of a more restrictive
interpretation of section 1962(c), particularly in the context of profes-
sional service activities, such as the accounting industry.277 Professionals
have experienced a liability crisis in which they have become the "in-
surer[s] of last resort" for investors of failed businesses.278 As a result,
independent professionals can potentially incur a level of damages
269. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1173 (1993) (stating that outsiders will be
liable under section 1963(c) "if they are 'associated with' an enterprise and participate in
the conduct of its affairs) (emphasis omitted).
270. Id. at 1172-73.
271. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
272. See supra note 119 (discussing the Supreme Court's perceived mandate to inter-
pret RICO broadly).
273. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499 (conceding "'[t]he fact that RICO has been applied to
situations not expressly anticipated by Congress' ") (quoting Haroco, Inc. v. American
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985)); see
also supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that RICO's application
to garden-variety fraud and ordinary commercial disputes distorts Congress' original legis-
lative intent to combat organized criminal behavior).
274. Compare Sedima, 473 U.S. at 498 (stating that the congressional directive to inter-
pret RICO liberally is mandatory) with Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1172 (stating that the liberal
construction clause is only appropriate in the event of ambiguity and is not an invitation to
apply RICO in contexts unintended by Congress).
275. Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1172.
276. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text (discussing civil RICO and the de-
bate over whether Congress intended to limit RICO's application to activities traditionally
associated with organized crime, or to extend RICO to cover a much broader range of
conduct).
277. See McDonough, Note, supra note 20, at 1109-10 (discussing the accounting indus-
try's protest to its susceptibility to RICO prosecutions in light of the congressional intent to
prosecute members of organized crime). Moreover, the author observes that " 'accounting
firms that profess to be guilty of nothing worse than regrettable credulity in their client
dealings, have increasingly found themselves the targets of the same sort of financial and
public relations abuse that known mobsters must endure.' " Id. at 1110 n.15 (quoting Joe
Queenan, RICO Strikes Again! A Growing List of Businesses are Hit by Racketeering
Charges, BARRON'S Dec. 12, 1988, at 8, 20).
278. McDonough, Note, supra note 20, at 1107.
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through traditional business fraud that is grossly in excess of their level of
culpability in the commercial transaction. 279 By imposing a heightened
level of culpability to trigger RICO liability, professionals can perform
their functions without the threat of unwarranted liability.280
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's adoption of the operation or man-
agement test does not inhibit RICO's potential ability to target other
forms of serious and pervasive criminality. The operation or manage-
ment test is consistent with prior applications of section 1962(c) despite
the differences in the articulations of the participation requirement.28' In
Scotto,282 for example, the defendant, as president of the local union and
vice-president of the national union, accepted numerous bribes to direct
the union to disregard violations of the collective bargaining agree-
ment.283 He actively participated in the operation and management of
the union's activities by directing the union's affairs.284 Similarly, in Yar-
brough,2 s5 the defendant participated in the operation or management of
279. Wright, supra note 12, at 994. The author argues that, by providing for treble
damages, RICO has intensified the trend to target professionals for losses sustained as a
result of fraud. Id. He states: "The imposition of disproportionate liability upon profes-
sionals has created a serious imbalance. People first in line for moral condemnation are
ignored in the search for money. Peripheral figures and their insurance carriers become
the exclusive sources of monetary recovery. The imbalance is real, not just theoretical."
Id.
280. See Brief for AICPA in support of Respondent at 23-30, Reves v. Ernst & Young,
113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993) (No. 90-886). The Institute argued that an expansive interpretation
of RICO liability induces extortionate litigation and coercive settlements, which threaten
the accounting professional's ability and willingness to provide accounting services to
smaller businesses and risky enterprises. Id. One author states:
Increased litigation against accountants by the victims of failed businesses has
forced the industry to reevaluate its traditional function as public watchdog and
curtail its auditing of financially troubled or "high risk" businesses . . . [which
could result in] investors in "high risk" businesses not receiv[ing] necessary infor-
mation about the most financially troubled public corporations.
McDonough, Note, supra note 20, at 1130 (footnote omitted); see Wright, supra note 12, at
995 (arguing that defining the contours of liability is necessary because "[tihe power to
encourage proper conduct exists only if there is some benefit-i.e., freedom from expo-
sure-from conformity. If an individual will be sued no matter what his conduct, what
incentive is there to exercise care?").
281. Brodsky, supra, note 21, at 7 (indicating that prior decisions required at least as
much direction as the test articulated in Reves).
282. United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961
(1981).
283. Id. at 50-52.
284. See United States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194, 200 (3d Cir. 1982) (satisfying the
operation or management test by accepting bribes as a manager in exchange for filing
fewer worker compensation claims).
285. United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 866
(1988).
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the enterprise's affairs through his active membership and participation in
both the racketeering activity and the RICO enterprise.286
In the context of professional services, Reves' operation or manage-
ment test properly rejects the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Bank of
America.287 Bank of America extended RICO liability to an accountant
because he participated in services that were "necessary or helpful to the
... enterprise."2 As the critics of that decision point out, RICO liabil-
ity is based on more than just mere participation; rather, it is premised on
participation in the management or direction of the enterprise's affairs.289
In contrast, the Second Circuit's decisions involving professional RICO
liability are in accord with the operation or management test and cor-
rectly designate an element of direction as a prerequisite for liability
under section 1962(c). 290 As both the dissent and majority concede in
Reves, the performance of traditional peripheral services will not rise to
the level of directing an enterprise's affairs. 291 The more difficult issue,
however, remains unresolved. Courts must still determine the point at
which the fraudulent performance of peripheral services rises to a level of
management or direction that will trigger RICO liability.
B. Post-Reves Implications of the Operation or Management Test
As a result of Reves, traditional auditing activity, although fraudulent,
will correctly be outside of the scope RICO liability. 292 Furthermore, in-
286. Id. at 1544; see also United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984) (satisfying the operation or management test by directing a
smuggling operation and providing the necessary money and property required to make it
successful).
287. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966 (11th
Cir. 1986).
288. Id. at 970; see also supra notes 168-76 (discussing the Eleventh Circuit's standard).
289. See supra note 177 (criticizing the Eleventh Circuit's formulation of the participa-
tion standard).
290. See Goldman v. McMahan, Brahman, Morgan & Co., 706 F. Supp. 256, 262
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (noting that RICO liability will not attach where the predicate acts are
unrelated to the enterprise or one's position in it); Plains/Anadarko-P Ltd. Partnership v.
Coopers & Lybrand, 658 F. Supp. 238, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding that traditional audit-
ing activity is not actionable under RICO).
291. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1174 (1993) (concluding that Arthur
Young's concealment of information in its audit reports is not sufficient to impose RICO
liability); Id. at 1175 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that "[i]f Arthur Young had confined
itself in this case to the role traditionally performed by an outside auditor, I could agree
with the majority that Arthur Young took no part in the management or operation of the
Co-op").
292. See, e.g., University of Md. at Baltimore v. Peat Marwick, Main & Co., 996 F.2d
1534 (3d Cir. 1993) (dismissing a RICO claim against a group of independent auditors who
merely performed deficient financial services); Nolte v. Pearson, 994 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir.
1993) (affirming a directed verdict in favor of attorneys and accountants who gave tax
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dependent professionals who perform services at the decisionmaking
level, and induce a business to act in a certain manner, may not implicate
RICO.2 93 The point at which an independent professional exerts influ-
ence over the enterprise or engages in the decisionmaking process should
serve as the demarcation line between those professionals rendering truly
independent services and those who are embroiled in the enterprise's af-
fairs.2 94 At this level of involvement, the service-provider is participating
in the management or operation of the enterprise, rather than its own
business affairs.295 The trend to limit RICO liability to a more culpable
class of fraud perpetrators, as confirmed by Reves, is likely to continue,
advice based solely on information provided by employees of an enterprise); Gilmore v.
Berg, 820 F. Supp. 179 (D.N.J. 1993) (finding that an attorney who prepared false private
placement memoranda regarding limited partnerships was not liable under RICO because
he did not direct the legal entities he represented to engage in particular transactions).
293. See Biofeedtrac, Inc. v. Kolinor Optical Enters. & Consultants, S.R.L., 832 F.
Supp. 585 (E.D. N.Y. 1993) (holding that an attorney who provides legal advice and serv-
ices to clients, in an effort to further the clients' schemes to defraud, does not violate
RICO); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Felicetti, 830 F. Supp. 257, 260 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(finding that "even where the wrongdoers provide misleading or fraudulent information
which significantly influences a major decision of the enterprise, this still does not consti-
tute 'operation or management' of the enterprise in order for 1962(c) liability to attach").
294. See, e.g., G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections
on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 341-42 (1982). Professor Blakey dis-
cusses various types of fraud, such as commercial fraud, that should properly be subject to
a private RICO action. Id. at 341 n.223. Recognizing that peripheral service providers
may play a significant role in the commercial fraud that plagues the economy, Professor
Blakey argues that it is not surprising such activities are subject to private civil relief. Id. at
341. He notes that "[ojrganized crime, for example, used 'accountants, attorneys and busi-
ness consultants' to run its businesses." Id. at 341 n.223 (citing PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN
A FREE SOCIETY 189-91 (1967)). In addition, Professor Blakey describes the role of the
professional in the fraudulent conduct:
[O]ur society . . .[has developed an] increasing dependency on the profes-
sional's specialized knowledge. Attorneys, accountants, and others play a key
role in helping individuals and corporations conform to complex law and regula-
tions. Because of new laws designed to combat organized criminal activity and
expanded law enforcement investigative ability, organized crime figures ... rely
more on professional assistance .... [S]ome professionals misuse and violate the
rules by helping known criminals to exploit the law. Professionals.. . act as direct
consultants and advisors to organized crime groups for the purpose of assuring
the success of criminal conspiracies.
Id. at 342 n.223 (citing TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME, PRESIDENT'S COMMIS-
SION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 92 (1967). This illustrates
that a professional who has become embroiled in the enterprise's affairs is no longer acting
in an independent capacity.
295. Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1174. The majority stated, "[w]e need not decide in this case
how far § 1962(c) extends down the ladder of operation." Id. at 1173 n.9. The Court did
state, however, that an enterprise may be operated or managed by a lower level participant
who exert[s] control over [the enterprise]" or is "under the direction of upper manage-
ment." Id. at 1173.
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and will inhibit the application of RICO to professionals.296 Appropri-
ately, this result will reduce and potentially eliminate the inexorable
threat of treble damages for a class of defendants that is disproportion-
ately liable for the damages resulting from traditional business fraud.297
A heightened standard of culpability may even mitigate civil RICO abuse
by plaintiffs alleging violations predicated upon garden-variety fraud and
ordinary commercial disputes.298 Moreover, Reves' judicial restriction of
section 1962(c) will be welcomed by many who assert that existing federal
laws effectively sanction these fraudulent practices,299 as well as those
who maintain that courts should not displace existing laws by an overzeal-
ous use of civil RICO.3°
296. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, RICO Limits Set for Professionals; Back to the Law's In-
tent?, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 15, 1993, at 3 (stating that Reves marks the first significant limita-
tion on civil RICO and "will limit abusive cases by limiting potential defendants to those
actually running the enterprise, those inside and operating it," which will eliminate
"outside professionals and third parties who may be deep pockets" as potential targets).
However, § 1962(c) is only one of the mechanisms used to impose RICO liability. See
supra notes 72-75 (discussing RICO's substantive provisions).
297. Wright, supra note 12, at 994.
298. Any limitation on civil RICO will be welcomed by many commentators. For a
vociferous critique of civil RICO abuse, see L. Gordon Crovitz, How the RICO Monster
Mauled Wall Street, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1050, 1068 (1990). The author states:
It is doubtful that Congress would ever pass a criminal law that equates crimi-
nal syndicates with legitimate businesses and private citizens. Certainly this is not
what Congress envisioned in 1970 when it passed RICO. The question now is
whether Congress will admit that its faulty drafting has led to untold injustices.
RICO has led to coerced guilty pleas, which amount to legalized extortion. Out-
of-court payments to settle civil suits are little more than classic shakedowns. In-
deed, it is no exaggeration to conclude that until Congress finally repeals this
outrageous statute or the Supreme Court invalidates it, RICO will remain the real
racket.
Id. at 1068.
299. In Reves, for example, the jury found Arthur Young guilty of federal and state
security law violations and assessed damages in the amount of $6,121,652.94, which was not
disturbed on appeal. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310, 1322 (8th Cir. 1991),
aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993). See also TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 55 (reporting
that securities fraud accounted for 40% of civil RICO actions surveyed). Some commenta-
tors argue that civil RICO should be reformed to eliminate securities fraud as a RICO
predicate because "Congress has considered directly the appropriate remedy for violation
of the securities laws, and . . . it chose to limit such damages to actual damages."
Getzendanner, supra note 8, at 683 (footnote omitted). Moreover, greater liability in the
form of treble damages may contradict the goals of the federal securities laws by "de-
ter[ring] legitimate enterprise, imped[ing] the raising of capital, and impos[ing] excessive
litigation costs, costs that inevitably are borne by consumers and investors." Id. at 683-84
(quoting Daniel L. Goelzner, the General Counsel of the Securities and Exchange
Commission).
300. The federal securities laws are perhaps the most frequently cited as displaced by
civil RICO. See e.g., Crovitz, supra note 298, at 1055 ("[T]here is no evidence that Con-
gress intended to replace the Securities Act[s] of 1933 and 1934 with RICO; fraud in the
sale of securities by regulated brokers was already well covered by the criminal code.").
1068 [Vol. 43:1025
Professional Liability Under RICO
V. CONCLUSION
Reves marks a significant departure from traditional RICO jurispru-
dence. The Supreme Court's adoption of a restrictive interpretation of
the participation requirement demonstrates that the Court, in this limited
context, is not constrained by the congressional mandate to construe
RICO liberally. The Court's approach suggests that it is willing to restrict
RICO's breadth in the absence of congressional action. Despite its de-
parture from prior judicial interpretations, the Court remains faithful to
the statutory language and congressional intent. Independent profession-
als performing traditional peripheral services for a business should not be
subject to civil RICO liability unless the significance of their involvement
in the fraud can be demonstrated. Moreover, post-Reves restrictive appli-
cations of the operation or management test reveal a trend to further
confine the participation requirement. This trend ultimately may elimi-
nate professionals from the scope RICO liability. This result is appropri-
ate because it places a necessary limitation on the use and application of
the RICO statute against professionals who are disproportionately
threatened by civil damages resulting from traditional business fraud.
Other federal and state statutes will effectively target this conduct.
Catherine M. Clarkin
Additionally, the author cites the Securities and Exchange Commission's view that it did
not intend its decision to include securities fraud as a predicate act "to facilitate law en-
forcement against legitimate brokerages, but only against organized crime that used legiti-
mate brokerages." Id. at 1055-56. Moreover, the author indicates that the SEC did not
consider the possibility that RICO might contain a private remedy of treble damages for
successful plaintiffs in securities fraud actions " 'which might in any way implicate or re-
place the traditional securities statutes.'" Id. at 1056.
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